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INTRODUCTION
Justice Brandeis famously wrote for the Supreme Court in Erie
1
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins that “[t]here is no federal general common
2
law.” On the day that the Court handed down Erie, it handed down
another opinion written by Justice Brandeis resolving that the rule of
decision in an interstate boundary dispute was, notwithstanding Erie,
3
“federal common law.” Since that day, the Court has carved out various enclaves in which courts may apply so-called federal common law
4
as a rule of decision. These enclaves include “such narrow areas as
those concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States,
interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights
5
of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.”
In operation, the doctrine of federal common law is a ramshackle
one. The boundaries of the enclaves in which it may operate are uncertain, its propriety is disputed, and the distinction between it and
6
statutory and constitutional interpretation is elusive. Legal scholars
1

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Id. at 78.
3
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
4
It was Justice Harlan who, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964), first used the term “enclaves” to describe the operation of federal common
law: “[T]here are enclaves of federal judge-made law which bind the States.” Id. at
426.
5
Tex. Indus., v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
6
See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1248 n.7 (1996) (“In practice . . . the distinction between federal
common lawmaking and statutory (or constitutional) interpretation is often difficult to
2
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have propounded several theories that attempt to justify the existence
and scope of federal common law. Most theories fall into two categories: (1) those that argue that federal courts have inherent power to
make federal common law in certain circumstances; and (2) those
that argue that federal courts have power to make federal common
7
law only if Congress has delegated power to them to do so. Recently,
there has been a flurry of renewed interest in various aspects of fed8
eral common law.
A fact that has received little attention in discussions of the power
of federal courts to make federal common law is that state courts routinely make federal common law in as real a sense as federal courts
make it. A few scholars have observed in passing that federal common

discern.”); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 881, 892 (1986) (setting forth a definition of federal common law that “includes
rules that a court develops to fit within a scheme derived largely from constitutional or
statutory sources, and . . . decisions that could as easily be explained as constitutional
or statutory interpretation”); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (1975) (“[A]ny distinction
between constitutional exegesis and common law cannot be analytically precise, representing, as it does, differences of degree.”); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There
Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 332 (1980) (“The difference between ‘common law’ and ‘statutory interpretation’ is a difference in emphasis
rather than a difference in kind.”).
7
These theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Certain scholars argue
that one category explains the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of all federal common law.
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive
Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. L. REV. 761, 762-64 (1989) (arguing that
the making of federal common law is unjustified unless Congress has expressly delegated power to courts to do so); Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. L. REV.
805, 851-52 (1989) (setting forth an inherent power theory to justify all federal common law lawmaking by federal courts). Other scholars invoke both inherent and delegated power theories to argue that different categories of federal common law lawmaking are or are not justified. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of
Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 36-46 (1985) (invoking inherent power theory to
justify certain kinds of federal common law lawmaking exercises of federal courts,
delegated power theory to justify others, and no power theory to argue that others are
unjustified). For present purposes, it suffices to consider each theory individually, as
this Article analyzes whether either theory, as articulated by its proponents, can justify
the making of federal common law by state courts in any instance. See infra Part III.B.
8
See, e.g., Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Ultimate Independence of the Federal Courts: Defying the Supreme Court in the Exercise of Federal Common Law Powers, 36 CONN. L. REV. 425,
428-30 (2004) (exploring lower courts’ failure to follow the Supreme Court’s direction
in identifying rules of decision in the face of statutory silence); Michael P. Van Alstine,
Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 894 (2004) (discussing treaties as a valid source of federal law, mentioned in the Supremacy Clause but
not Erie); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 174-75 (2004) (finding the roots of personal jurisdiction rules in federal common law rather than in the Due Process Clause).
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9

law operates in state courts and have attributed this fact to the Su10
premacy Clause. Specifically, they have observed that if the Supreme
11
Court of the United States makes federal common law pursuant to
the Constitution, that federal common law is the supreme law of the
12
land, and state judges are bound to follow it. It is not the case, however, that state courts merely follow federal common law that the Supreme Court has made; rather, state courts regularly participate in the
development of federal common law themselves—in other words, they
make federal common law too.
This Article takes up the following question: what, if anything,
justifies the making of federal common law by state courts? The Article has four main purposes. The first purpose is to bring to light the
fact that state courts routinely make federal common law in as real a
sense as federal courts make it. The second purpose is to demonstrate
that theories that focus on whether the making of federal common
law by federal courts is justified are inadequate to explain whether the
making of federal common law by state courts is justified. The third
purpose is to offer an account of what, if anything, justifies the making
of federal common law by state courts. The fourth purpose is to identify the implications of this account for the operation of federal common law in federal courts.
It is a common premise of theories explaining the operation of
federal common law in federal courts that if federal courts are justified in making federal common law, they are justified in making it on
the basis of the kinds of reasons that move Congress to enact federal
13
statutes. This premise is problematic in an analysis of the operation
9

These scholars include Martha Field, supra note 6, at 897; Thomas Merrill, supra
note 7, at 6; and Judge Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405 (1964).
10
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
11
This Article will refer to the Supreme Court of the United States as the “Supreme Court” or the “Court”; it will refer to the supreme court of a state by its full
name.
12
See Field, supra note 6, at 897 (“[A] federal common law rule, once made, has
precisely the same force and effect as any other federal rule.”); Merrill, supra note 7, at
6 (arguing that “the Supreme Court is the final arbiter” of the content of federal
common law, “and the resulting rules are binding on state courts under the supremacy
clause of the Constitution”); see also Friendly, supra note 9, at 405 (describing federal
common law as “truly uniform because, under the supremacy clause, it is binding in
every forum”); cf. Weinberg, supra note 7, at 838 (arguing that “national policy concerns” are supreme and “[t]hus, the fashioning of federal common law, as our dual-law
system has evolved, not only cannot be illegitimate, but rather is within the clear contemplation of the supremacy clause”).
13
See infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
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of federal common law in state courts. Indeed, analyzing the operation of federal common law in state courts reveals grounds for rethinking whether this premise is valid even in analyses of the operation of federal common law in federal courts.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains how state courts
make federal common law. State courts regularly must determine
whether federal common law provides the rule of decision in a particular dispute and, if it does, what the substance of that rule is. In
making these determinations, state courts do not in all instances mechanically apply or follow law that the Supreme Court has made; often, they participate in the making of federal common law themselves.
When, for example, state courts encounter gaps in federal regulatory
schemes or must decide whether to extend federal common law rules
to novel claims or factual situations, their decisions may make federal
law in the same way that federal court decisions may make federal
common law in such circumstances. Indeed, in several instances, state
court decisions have made federal common law rules that are in conflict with federal common law rules that federal court decisions have
made.
Part II examines whether inherent and delegated power theories
of federal common law are adequate to explain the making of federal
common law by state courts. These theories, which focus primarily on
the power of federal courts to make federal common law, share a
common premise. They generally begin with the assumption that
federal courts make federal common law on the basis of the same
kinds of judgments that Congress makes when it enacts a statute:
14
“fundamental policy judgments,” judgments about “national substan15
tive policy,” judgments accounting for interests that Congress “takes
16
17
into account,” or simply “unguided normative judgments.” They
proceed to attempt to justify this manner of judicial lawmaking. As a
preliminary matter, Part II explains, the Supremacy Clause is inadequate to explain the making of federal common law by state courts in
this way. The Supremacy Clause provides that state judges are bound
18
by federal law; it does not provide that they have inherent power to
make the law to which the Clause renders them “bound,” nor that an
14

Redish, supra note 7, at 798.
Weinberg, supra note 7, at 851.
16
Field, supra note 6, at 957.
17
Merrill, supra note 7, at 72.
18
“[T]he Judges in every State shall be bound [by federal law].” U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2.
15
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act of Congress delegating legislative power to them to make federal
law would be one “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution. Part II
proceeds to examine whether inherent and delegated power theories
that legal scholars have developed to explain whether and when federal courts are justified in making federal common law are adequate
to explain whether and when state courts are justified in making federal common law. It concludes that each theory, applied on its own
terms, is inadequate to do so.
Part III proceeds to offer, by means of a case study, an explanation
of the making of federal common law by state courts that accounts for
historical practice, constitutional structure, and certain normative
considerations about the way in which courts can and ought to make
law. First, Part III explains, it is sometimes necessary for state courts to
make federal common law in order to render decisions in cases that
they have a constitutional duty to decide. Even if a federal statute or
constitutional amendment divested state courts of all power to make
federal common law, state courts still would, in a sense, have to make
federal common law in order to decide certain cases within their jurisdictions. State courts could no more comply with a command that
they adjudicate claims arising under federal law but make no new federal law with respect to them than they could comply with a command
that they both decide a case and not decide it. When it is necessary
for a state court to make federal common law in order to enforce federal law that it has a duty to enforce, the court is justified in making a
federal common law rule by which to decide the case. That a state
court is justified in such cases in making some federal common law
rule, however, does not mean that a state court is justified in making
any federal common law rule.
It is a common premise in writings on federal common law that if
a court is justified in making federal common law governing a matter
(because it has an inherent or delegated power to do so), the court is
justified in making it on the basis of the kinds of forward-looking policy considerations that might move Congress to enact a statute governing the matter. In the case of state courts, this premise lies in tension
not only with the way in which state courts historically have made federal common law, but also with the Supremacy Clause and certain
normative claims about the way in which courts ought to make law.
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As a general practice, state courts historically have not claimed to
19
make federal common law for the kinds of reasons that move legislatures to make law. Rather, they have represented themselves as rendering decisions that comport with the requirements of existing federal law. If we take them at their word, state courts have made federal
common law not with the intent to set national policy on a new
course, but as a necessary consequence of their best efforts to discern
and apply existing principles of national law. This manner of lawmaking differs from the manner in which scholars have presumed that
courts make federal common law and the manner in which the Supreme Court has self-consciously made federal common law in certain
20
cases. Even if state judges in reality have based their decisions on
purely forward-looking policy considerations, in exceptional cases or
as a general practice, the fact that they have professed to comply as
much as possible with the requirements of existing law suggests an
understanding that this has been the legitimate way for them to proceed.
This manner of lawmaking more easily comports with the Supremacy Clause than the “legislative” manner. The Supremacy Clause
provides that federal law shall be the “supreme Law of the Land” and
21
that state judges are “bound” to enforce it. A primary purpose of the
Clause is to protect federal lawmaking authority from its diffusion by
the states. A power in state courts to make the “supreme Law of the
Land” in the manner in which Congress makes it (and in certain cases
the Supreme Court has made it) is incompatible with supremacy principles regarding the nature of federal law and the duty of state judges
to enforce it.
Moreover, the manner in which state courts historically have professed to enforce federal common law accords with the normative
claim that a judge ought to treat litigants as far as is possible in the
same way that any other judge applying the same governing law in the
same realm on the same day would treat them.
Finally, Part IV offers preliminary thoughts on the implications of
this analysis for federal courts. It identifies similarities and differences

19

This includes principles of law that historically occupied some of the field that
modern courts describe as federal common law. See infra notes 295-304 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 405-08 and accompanying text (explaining how the Supreme
Court has self-consciously made federal common law based on purely forward-looking
policy considerations).
21
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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between federal and state courts that are relevant to an analysis of
whether the Supreme Court or other federal courts should be understood to have a greater power to make federal common law than the
one that, this Article argues, state courts have.
I. HOW STATE COURTS MAKE FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Before explaining how state courts make federal common law, it is
necessary to specify what is meant here by “federal common law.” A
common definition is “federal rules of decision whose content cannot
be traced by traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory
22
or constitutional commands.” Legal scholars typically understand
federal common law to begin where statutory and constitutional in23
terpretation end. The line that separates the interpretation of a federal enactment from the making of federal common law is elusive, to
be sure. There is, however, general acceptance that courts have decided cases according to federal rules of decision that defy categorization as either constitutional or statutory interpretation. A famous example is the Supreme Court’s application in Clearfield Trust Co. v.
24
United States of a rule of decision that it fashioned “according to [its]
25
own standards.”
It is worth noting the breadth of this definition of federal common law. “[F]ederal rules of decision whose content cannot be traced
by traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory or consti26
tutional commands” is broad enough to encompass certain judicial

22

RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 685 (5th ed. 2003).
23

WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS

See, e.g., Clark, supra note 6, at 1247 (describing federal common law as “federal
judge-made law—that is, rules of decision adopted and applied by federal courts that
have the force and effect of positive federal law, but whose content cannot be traced by
traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional command”
(footnote and internal quotation marks omitted)); Field, supra note 6, at 890 (using
“‘federal common law’ to refer to any rule of federal law created by a court (usually
but not invariably a federal court) when the substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by
federal enactments—constitutional or congressional” (footnote omitted)); Larry Kramer,
The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 267 (1992) (“[T]he
common law includes any rule articulated by a court that is not easily found on the
face of an applicable statute.”); Merrill, supra note 7, at 5 (using “federal common law”
to mean “any federal rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some
authoritative federal text—whether or not that rule can be described as the product of
‘interpretation’ in either a conventional or an unconventional sense”).
24
318 U.S. 363 (1943).
25
Id. at 367.
26
FALLON ET AL., supra note 22, at 685.
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determinations about the propriety of different methods of interpretation and manners of formulating legal principle (for example, categorical rule versus balancing test). Judges frequently dispute and resolve such matters without any pretense of appeal to federal statutory
or constitutional provisions.
As used here, the phrase “federal common law” denotes rules of
decision not only that judges have made in a way that defies categorization as constitutional or statutory interpretation, but also that, at
some level of generality, claim to operate uniformly within the jurisdiction of the United States. There are at least three levels at which
courts have made federal common law determinations. A court proceeds to each subsequent level only if it answers affirmatively the question posed at the prior level. Level One is whether federal common
law provides the rule of decision in a given case; Level Two is whether
the content of a federal common law rule of decision should be uniform throughout the jurisdiction of the United States (as opposed to
incorporating state law); and Level Three is what the content of a uniform federal common law rule of decision should be.
Consider Level Three first. When a court applies a federal common law rule of decision with content that displaces the laws of the
several states, it is applying a rule that purportedly all courts in the
Union would apply in the same circumstances. The following passage
from Clearfield Trust is illustrative: “The rights and duties of the
United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by
federal rather than local law. . . . The desirability of a uniform rule is
27
plain.”
Consider next Level Two. Even when courts characterize the content of federal common law as incorporating state law, the federal determination that federal common law should incorporate state law is
governed by a federal common law standard that purports to have
28
uniform national content. In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., for
example, the Court determined whether the content of federal common law, which governed because certain rights of the United States
were involved, should be uniform or rather should incorporate state
29
law. The Court invoked a standard that would govern the question
in any court in the Union: the Court assessed whether there was a
“need for a nationally uniform body of law,” whether “application of

27
28
29

Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366-67.
440 U.S. 715 (1979).
Id. at 727-28.
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state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs,”
and whether “application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial
30
relationships predicated on state law.”
Consider, finally, Level One. A standard that determines whether
federal common law governs a dispute at all, which can qualify, itself,
31
as federal common law, operates as though it has uniform content
throughout the jurisdiction of the United States. In Texas Industries v.
32
Radcliff Materials, Inc., for example, the Court applied a standard that
it claimed any court in the Union resolving the same issue would apply: was federal common law “necessary to protect uniquely federal
33
interests”?
Whether there is any meaningful practical distinction between
34
these levels is open to question. As a practical matter, it seems that
these three questions—whether federal common law applies; if so,
whether federal common law should incorporate state law or have nationally uniform content; and, if federal common law should have nationally uniform content, what that content should be—boil down to
one: is there a national interest that no federal constitutional or statutory rule of decision affirmatively effects or protects from state law in a
35
given case but that a federal rule of decision should effect or protect?

30

Id. at 728-29.
See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 7, at 36 (describing the decision as to whether federal common law displaces state law as the first step of “preemptive lawmaking,” a “type
of federal common law”).
32
451 U.S. 630 (1981).
33
Id. at 640 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)).
34
For commentary by the Supreme Court relating to this question, see Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). The Court stated that
[s]ome of our cases appear to regard the area in which a uniquely federal interest exists as being entirely governed by federal law, with federal law deigning to borrow or incorporate or adopt state law except where a significant
conflict with federal policy exists. We see nothing to be gained by expanding
the theoretical scope of the federal pre-emption beyond its practical effect . . . .
Id. at 507 n.3 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted).
35
In many cases, this question would render indistinct the question whether federal common law rather than state law applies from the question whether federal law
preempts state law. With a judicial determination that a federal rule of decision protecting national interests should be applied, state law is simultaneously preempted. In
Boyle, for example, the Court had to decide whether the plaintiff could sue a helicopter
manufacturer for the wrongful death of his son, a Marine, who died in the crash of a
helicopter manufactured by the defendant. Id. at 502. The Court held that the defendant could not be sued, reasoning that the liability of a federal military contractor is
a question “so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal
31
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The judicial application of a rule of decision that will effect or protect
that interest is essentially the operation of federal common law. The
greater the extent to which the Constitution and Congress are
thought to specify the national interests that courts are to effect or
36
protect in this way, the lesser the scope of federal common law. The
greater the extent to which other sources of law are thought capable
of identifying the national interests that courts may effect or protect in
37
this way, the greater the scope of federal common law.
It is worth noting that there is no obvious line distinguishing judicial acts that make federal common law from judicial acts that merely
apply preexisting federal law. Indeed, distinguishing between making
and applying law has been notoriously difficult for courts. A familiar
context in which courts have attempted to distinguish such acts is il38
lustrative. Under Teague v. Lane, federal courts have had to determine whether particular decisions constitute the making of “new
rules” or the application of “old rules” for purposes of determining
whether a rule applies retroactively on habeas corpus review: old
39
rules apply retroactively on habeas review while new rules do not.
The plurality in Teague conceded that while it is “often difficult to determine when a case announces a new rule . . . . [i]n general . . . a case
announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new
40
obligation on the States or the Federal Government.” In a related
41
subsequent case, Stringer v. Black, the Court explained that courts
make new rules “by the invocation of a rule that was not dictated by

control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a
content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts—so-called ‘federal
common law.’” Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
36
See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 7, at 36, 40 (stating that a court may make law when
it “finds that the adoption of state law as the rule of decision would unduly frustrate or
undermine a federal policy as to which there is a specific intention on the part of the
enacting body” or when Congress or the Constitution has determined that the national
interest requires that courts have power “to fashion federal rules of decision in order
to round out or complete a constitutional or statutory scheme”); see also Clark, supra
note 6, at 1251 (arguing that a federal common law rule is justified only if it “operate[s] to further some basic aspect of the constitutional scheme”).
37
See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 7, at 813-27 (arguing that apart from jurisdictional limitations, there are no limits on the power of courts to make law “when the
national interest so requires,” with courts having power to “decide whatever federal
issues properly come before them along the whole continuum of national policy concerns”).
38
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
39
Id. at 308-10 (plurality portion of opinion).
40
Id. at 301.
41
503 U.S. 222 (1992).

836

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 153: 825

precedent” or “by the application of an old rule in a manner that was
42
not dictated by precedent.”
Federal courts have had to make similar determinations in enforcing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a provision of the Antiterrorism and Ef43
fective Death Penalty Act of 1996 that subsumed the Teague analysis
in many cases. Under the statute federal courts may not grant a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner with respect to any claim that a
state court adjudicated on the merits unless the state court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
44
45
by the Supreme Court of the United States.” In Williams v. Taylor,
the Court explained that generally “whatever would qualify as an old
rule under our Teague jurisprudence will constitute ‘clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
46
States’ under § 2254(d)(1).” Recently, in applying this standard to a
state court decision, the Supreme Court recognized that “the differ47
ence between applying a rule and extending it is not always clear.”
On the one hand, the Court observed, “[c]ertain principles are fundamental enough that when new factual permutations arise, the ne48
cessity to apply the earlier rule will be beyond doubt.” On the other
hand, the Court explained, there is “force to th[e] argument” that “if
a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts
at hand then the rationale cannot be clearly established at the time of
49
the state-court decision.” In such cases, courts may be making new
50
rules “under the guise of extensions to existing law.”
There is no need for present purposes to draw a line distinguishing between the application of old law and the making of new law, if
indeed such a line can meaningfully be drawn. Suffice it to say that to
the extent that federal courts “make” new rules of federal common
law, state courts do as well. State courts exercise concurrent jurisdic-

42

Id. at 228.
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 18, 19, 21, 22, 28, 42, and 49 U.S.C.).
44
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
45
529 U.S. 362 (2000).
46
Id. at 412. “The one caveat . . . is that § 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly
established law” to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. Id.
47
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2151 (2004).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 2150-51.
50
Id. at 2151 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).
43
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51

tion with federal courts over most civil federal claims and must recognize valid federal defenses in cases over which inferior federal
52
courts lack jurisdiction. Accordingly, state courts have sufficient opportunity to make federal common law in as real a sense as federal
courts make it. In fact, state courts, like federal courts, have made
judgments about the application or meaning of federal common law
principles that by all appearances were not the only judgments that
they could have justified in light of existing law. The making of such a
judgment by State Court A can operate as an authoritative rule of decision against individuals within the jurisdiction of State Court A.
Moreover, the making of such a judgment by State Court A can operate to foreclose courts that are bound to rule in accordance with the
decision of State Court A from making a judgment about the requirements of federal common law that was justifiable before State Court A
ruled but is no longer so by virtue of the judgment of State Court A.
In this way, at least, it is beyond question that state courts make federal common law.
The Supreme Court has said little about the operation of federal
common law in state courts—only that where it applies state courts
53
must apply it. It is not difficult to find cases in which a federal common law rule that the Supreme Court has set forth appears to warrant

51

See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-59 (1990) (explaining that the Court has
“consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively
competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States,” though
“[t]his deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction is, of
course, rebutted if Congress affirmatively ousts the state courts of jurisdiction over a
particular federal claim”).
52
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000), federal district courts “have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”;
as the Court has interpreted this statute, federal district courts lack jurisdiction over
countless cases in which federal questions are involved, most notably over those in
which an assertion of federal law does not form part of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded
complaint. In Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908),
the Court held that “a suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States
only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based
upon those laws or that Constitution.” In other words, as the Court explained more
recently, “[a] defense that raises a federal question is inadequate to confer federal jurisdiction.” Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (citing
Mottley). In such cases, state courts will have exclusive jurisdiction and an obligation
under the Supremacy Clause to recognize federal defenses.
53
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964) (explaining
with respect to the “act of state” doctrine that state courts are “not left free to develop
their own doctrines”); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962)
(explaining that “in a case such as this [involving a strike], incompatible doctrines of
local law must give way to principles of federal labor law”).
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one and only one resolution of an issue raised in state court. Consider, for example, the recent Missouri state court case of Butler v. Bur54
lington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. The plaintiff in Butler sued
the defendant railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act
55
56
(FELA) for negligent infliction of emotional distress. He alleged
that the railroad required him to attend a party at which two female
police officers (or so it appeared to him) handcuffed and hit a coworker, who that very evening had received a “Man of the Year”
57
award. The “officers” in fact were strippers. The plaintiff alleged
that the spectacle of the “officers” hitting the “Man of the Year” trig58
gered in him “a post-traumatic ‘flashback’” to his prior arrests. In
considering his claim for emotional distress, the Missouri Court of
59
Appeals applied the federal common law “zone of danger” test. The
Supreme Court has held that this test governs claims for negligent in60
fliction of emotional distress under FELA. The parties and the court
in Butler all agreed that the “zone of danger” test was the governing
standard. This test “limits recovery for emotional injury to those
plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant’s
negligent conduct, or who are placed in immediate risk of physical
61
harm by that conduct.” Because the plaintiff failed to allege a physical impact, and there was no evidence that he was in any risk of physi62
cal harm, his claim failed. “[T]o recognize his claim under the actual circumstances presented in this case,” the Missouri court
explained, “would be to stretch the federal common law zone of danger test well beyond the bounds laid down by the United States Su63
preme Court.” Given how the plaintiff framed his claim and presented facts in support of it, it appears that one and only one
determination of his claim was warranted under Supreme Court
precedent.
The requirements of Supreme Court precedent in cases in which
state courts apply federal common law rules of decision are not always
so clear. In some cases, state courts appear to be not merely applying
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

119 S.W.3d 620 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000).
Butler, 119 S.W.3d at 621.
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id. at 626.
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 554 (1994).
Butler, 119 S.W.3d at 624 (quoting Consol. Rail Corp., 512 U.S. at 547-48).
Id. at 626-27.
Id. at 627.
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federal common law rules of decision but participating in their development. While state courts consider themselves bound by Supreme
Court decisions, most state courts do not view themselves as generally
bound by the decisions of any particular inferior federal court on matters of federal law, even of the United States court of appeals encom64
passing a court’s state. When consulted, inferior federal court decisions may be in conflict with each other or fail to convey federal
common law rules of decision to a degree of specificity that would enable a state court to apply them without participating in their development. In some instances, state courts have expressly rejected federal common law rules that inferior federal courts have developed in
favor of rules that they believed to be better reasoned. Where federal
common law governs an issue in state court but Supreme Court
precedents do not establish a rule of decision that warrants one and
only one resolution of that issue, state courts have recognized that
they may have to determine how “federal common law should be de65
veloped.”
This Part illustrates how state courts participate in the development of federal common law. It uses examples of the operation of
federal common law rules in state court from the various enclaves in
66
which federal common law operates, including admiralty cases; disputes in which the operation of state law would improperly interfere

64

Donald Zeigler has summarized state court precedent in this regard as follows:
“Virtually all state courts agree that they are bound by U.S. Supreme Court decisions
interpreting federal law,” but “[s]tate courts vary greatly in the weight they give to
lower federal court decisions.” Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1143, 1143 (1999) (footnote omitted). In cataloguing cases in support of these
conclusions, he reports that “some state courts consider themselves bound by lower
federal court decisions when the lower federal courts are in agreement,” but not when
there is conflict in the federal courts. Id. at 1153-54. Some state courts give greater
weight to the federal court of appeals encompassing the state, while others do not. Id.
at 1156-57. Some states will follow federal court decisions interpreting statutes but not
those interpreting the Constitution. Id. at 1155. The Supreme Court has never
squarely addressed these matters. Cf. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires
that a state court’s interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court’s
interpretation.”); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[S]tate courts . . .
possess the authority, absent a provision for exclusive federal jurisdiction, to render
binding judicial decisions that rest on their own interpretations of federal law.”).
65
Keen v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Tex.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1047 (2003).
66
In Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), the Court described “general maritime law,” as the Court has long described it, as “a species of
judge-made federal common law.” Id. at 206.
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67

with federal interests; and disputes implicating the rights and obliga68
tions of the United States. State courts have made federal common
law at all three levels at which courts and scholars have described federal common law as operating: (1) whether federal common law provides the rule of decision; (2) whether the content of a federal common law rule should be nationally uniform or rather incorporate state
law; and (3) what the content of a nationally uniform federal common
law rule should be.
A. Whether Federal Common Law Provides the Rule of Decision
First, state courts have developed federal law on the question
whether federal common law provides the rule of decision in a particular case. Consider a contested issue of federal law in admiralty
cases that has received scholarly attention: whether, in a maritime
69
case, a court may award attorneys’ fees under state law. The Supreme Court has stated that state law applies in maritime cases unless
“it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress,
or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and uni70
formity of that law in its international and interstate relations.” This
standard is generally interpreted to involve a balancing of state and
71
federal interests. The Washington Court of Appeals recently held in

67

In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), the court explained
that “a few areas, involving ‘uniquely federal interests,’ are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted and
replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts—so-called ‘federal common law.’” Id. at 504 (citation
omitted).
68
See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) (explaining that “[t]he duties [of] the United States and the rights acquired by it as a result of
the issuance” of a check by the United States “find their roots in the same federal
sources” and that “[i]n absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal
courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards”).
69
See generally David W. Robertson, Court-Awarded Attorneys’ Fees in Maritime Cases:
The ‘American Rule’ in Admiralty, 27 J. MAR. L. & COM. 507 (1996) (discussing this question).
70
S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
71
As the First Circuit has noted:
Where substantive law is involved [in a maritime case], we think that the
Supreme Court’s past decisions yield no single, comprehensive test as to
where harmony is required and when uniformity must be maintained.
Rather, the decisions however couched reflect a balancing of the state and
federal interests in any given case.
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72

Axess International Ltd. v. Intercargo Insurance Co. that, under this standard, state law, rather than federal common law, governs whether a
73
party is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees in a maritime case. After
considering federal precedent, the Washington court resolved that
“the harmony and uniformity of maritime law does not mandate pre74
emption of the attorney fees determination.” It reasoned that the
State of Washington had a strong interest in providing attorneys’ fees
to parties like the plaintiff (“insureds who must resort to litigation to
75
establish coverage”), and that the federal interest in a nationally uni76
form law was “not apparent.” In one sense, the Washington court
merely applied Supreme Court precedent to resolve this contested issue of law. As Supreme Court precedent required, the Washington
court determined whether state law would interfere with the “proper
harmony and uniformity” of maritime law. In another sense, however,
the Washington court made law on this question. To be sure, the Supreme Court had set forth the standard that the Washington court
applied—whether state law “interfere[d] with the proper harmony
and uniformity” of general maritime law. The Supreme Court had
not explicitly set forth, however, any particular metric for determining
the propriety of a given level of harmony or uniformity or the relative
importance to ascribe to particular state and federal interests. To apply the Supreme Court’s standard, the Washington court necessarily
made judgments that rendered it a participant in the development of
federal common law rules. Significantly, certain federal courts, contrary to the Washington court, have determined that there is a uniform federal law governing attorneys’ fees in maritime cases, and that

Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 628 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Kossick
v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 738-42 (1961); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442-48 (1960)); see also Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Aubry, 918
F.2d 1409, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Whether Aubry’s application of California’s overtime
provisions unduly disrupts federal maritime harmony in violation of the Constitution
depends on the balance of federal and state interests involved in application of the
overtime provisions.”).
As for procedural law applied in maritime cases, the Supreme Court has suggested
that there is no preemption of state law. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443,
453 (1994) (“Wherever the boundaries of permissible state regulation may lie, they do
not invalidate state rejection of forum non conveniens, [because] it is procedural rather
than substantive, and it is most unlikely to produce uniform results.”).
72
30 P.3d 1 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
73
Id. at 8.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.

842

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 153: 825

77

therefore state law cannot apply. Indeed, there is a split of authority
78
in the United States Courts of Appeals on this very question. Ultimately, the Washington court discerned and applied a federal rule of
decision that state law governed the attorneys’ fees question before it,
while certain inferior federal courts have discerned and applied a federal rule of decision that federal maritime law, not state law, governs
such attorneys’ fees questions. The judgment that the Washington
court made forecloses future courts that are bound to rule in accordance with its judgment from making the different judgment that certain federal courts have made on this very question. In a real sense,
then, the Washington court decision made federal law on the question whether the rule of decision in a given case should be state law or
federal common law.
There is another way in which state courts have participated in the
development of federal law on the question whether state law or federal common law supplies the rule of decision in a particular category
of cases. In several instances, state courts have applied state law to determine an issue without regard to the fact that federal courts have
held that federal common law governs that same issue. A few examples suffice to illustrate this phenomenon. Federal courts routinely
have held that federal common law governs the enforceability and interpretation of agreements settling claims arising under federal stat79
80
81
82
utes, e.g., claims arising under FELA, § 1983, Title VII, ERISA,
77

See, e.g., Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenealy, 72 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 1995)
(holding that prior precedent “suffices to ‘establish’ a federal admiralty rule, which
now must be followed instead of state law”).
78
Compare Kenealy, 72 F.3d at 270 (holding that general maritime law prohibits
attorneys’ fees), with All Underwriters v. Weisberg, 222 F.3d 1309, 1314-15 (11th Cir.
2000) (rejecting “a unitary and uniform federal rule respecting attorney’s fees in maritime insurance litigation”).
79
Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000). In Dice v. Akron,
Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952), the Supreme Court held that
the “validity of releases under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act raises a federal
question to be determined by federal rather than state law.” Id. at 361.
80
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)); see also Hill v. City of Cleveland, 12 F.3d 575, 577 (6th Cir. 1993)
(holding that “[t]he question whether the policies underlying section 1983 may in
some circumstances render [such an agreement] unenforceable is a question of federal law” (alteration in original) (quoting Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,
392 (1987) (plurality opinion))) ; Oliver v. City of Berkley, 261 F. Supp. 2d 870, 876-77
(E.D. Mich. 2003) (applying Rumery and other federal law to determine enforceability
of a release in a § 1983 claim).
81
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000); see also
Snider v. Circle K Corp., 923 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that “[f]ederal
common law governs the enforcement and interpretation of [Title VII settlement]
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83

and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. Notwithstanding this
federal precedent, state courts have, in several cases, applied state law
to resolve the enforceability or interpretation of settlement agreements of claims arising under federal law. In particular, state courts
have applied state law to the following questions: whether a settlement agreement of various federal claims foreclosed a claim for back
84
pay; whether a release agreement of, inter alia, a § 1983 claim in85
cluded a confidentiality provision; whether settlement agreements of
86
various federal claims reserved certain rights in plaintiffs; and
whether the settlement of an ERISA claim precluded an employee
87
from participating in a stock distribution. Another issue that certain
state courts have decided according to state law notwithstanding federal court precedent to the contrary is whether (and at what rate) the
prevailing party on a federal claim is entitled to prejudgment interest.
Certain federal courts have held that “[t]he award of prejudgment in88
terest for a federal law violation is governed by federal common law”
89
90
(for instance, for an ERISA or federal securities law violation). Sev-

agreements” and citing cases from other circuits holding same). But see Dhaliwal v.
Woods Div., Hesston Corp., 930 F.2d 547, 548 (7th Cir. 1991) (expressing “doubts that
Title VII settlement agreements are in fact covered by general law—federal common
law—rather than by state contract law”).
82
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000); see
also Morais v. Cent. Beverage Corp. Union Employees’ Supp. Ret. Plan, 167 F.3d 709,
711 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that it is “well settled” that federal common law applies to
settlement agreement of ERISA-based claims).
83
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (2000); see also Williams v. Metzler, 132 F.3d 937, 946 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that if a “settlement agreement involves a right to sue derived from a federal statute . . . federal common law
principles govern construction of the contract”).
84
See Moon v. Terrell County, 579 S.E.2d 845, 846-47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (applying state law precedent to determine whether a settlement of federal claims forecloses
claims for back pay in a state action and whether plaintiff had standing to assert such
claims).
85
See Loe v. Town of Thomaston, 600 A.2d 1090, 1092 (Me. 1991) (applying
Maine contract law to interpret a release agreement in a § 1983 claim).
86
See Anderson v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 103 S.W.3d 394, 398-400 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2003) (applying Missouri law to interpret a settlement agreement between professors and the university).
87
See Prof’l Med. Ins. Co. v. Lakin, 88 S.W.3d 471, 476-79 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)
(applying Missouri law to uphold a settlement agreement excluding plaintiff from an
employee stock ownership program).
88
Rivera v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 1991).
89
See Ford v. Uniroyal Pension Plan, 154 F.3d 613, 616-20 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the award of prejudgment interest on an ERISA claim may be governed by a uniform rule of federal common law).
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eral state courts, notwithstanding this federal precedent, have applied
state law to claims for prejudgment interest on claims arising under
91
federal law.
At first glance, these examples may appear to prove only that in
certain instances state courts have applied state law to a particular
question because they were unaware of the real possibility that federal
law might govern it, not that state courts made any federal law in applying state law. A court that squarely faces a federal-state choice of law
question in a future case might deem these cases to have no precedential effect on the question whether federal or state law applies.
But that will not necessarily be the case. A court facing such a question might cite such cases as precedent supporting a conclusion that
state law applies. Courts commonly cite prior cases for what they did
rather than for what they may or may not have said. A decision by
State Court A applying state law without explanation may lend support
in a future case to Court B (or State Court A, for that matter) applying
state law in the face of an argument that Court B should apply federal
92
common law. Whether Court B finds the decision of State Court A

90

See Koch v. Koch Indus., 996 F. Supp. 1273, 1279 (D. Kan. 1998) (holding that
“[f]ederal law governs an award of prejudgment interest on a federal securities law
claim”).
91
See, e.g., Paul R. Peterson Constr. v. Ariz. State Carpenters Health & Welfare
Trust Fund, 880 P.2d 694, 704-06 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (applying state law to questions
of prejudgment interest in an ERISA action); Shideler v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins., 563 So.
2d 1082, 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (applying state law to determine availability of
prejudgment interest in an ERISA action); Mayes v. City of Columbus, 706 N.E.2d 402,
406 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (applying state law to a question of prejudgment interest on
a § 1983 claim); City of Alamo v. Casas, 960 S.W.2d 240, 260 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (applying state law to questions of prejudgment interest on a § 1983 claim).
There are examples of state courts disregarding Supreme Court precedent in this
regard as well. The Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he proposition that federal
common law continues to govern the “obligations to and rights of the United States
under its contracts’ is nearly as old as Erie itself.” Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487
U.S. 500, 519 (1988). There are cases, however, in which state courts have applied
state law to discern the rights and obligations of the United States under its contracts.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Clark v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of W. Va., Inc., 510 S.E.2d 764, 78789 (W. Va. 1998) (applying state contract law to ascertain whether a contract existed
between the United States Office of Personnel Management and a private entity).
92
For example, in American Nonwovens, Inc. v. Non Wovens Engineering, S.R.L., 648
So. 2d 565 (Ala. 1994), the court stated:
While these cases are certainly not controlling, because in them the choice of
law issue was not argued and because they are products-liability cases, they are
examples of cases in which we have applied Alabama law to determine
whether a nonresident corporation is liable as a corporate successor on claims
arising under Alabama law.
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to compel that judgment (if, say, Court B is an inferior court to State
Court A) or merely to support it, Court B will cite that decision as
law—law that in a real sense State Court A would have made when it
applied state law without explanation.
B. Whether the Content of Federal Common Law Is State or Federal Law
If federal common law provides a rule of decision, a court may
have to decide whether the substance of that rule is state law or a uniform federal rule. State courts have made federal common law on this
question in the same way that they have made it in determining questions of whether federal common law applies at all. The decision of
the Court of Appeals of Texas in Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v. Fed93
eral Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. provides an example. In Glen
Ridge, the debtor of a failed savings and loan association filed suit to
enjoin the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC),
as receiver of the failed savings and loan, from foreclosing on its
94
property. A question before the Texas court was whether federal
common law governed the case as a nationally uniform rule or by incorporating state law. The court began its analysis by explaining that
the case “involves the rights of the United States arising under a nationwide federal program and will be governed by a juridical construct
95
to be formally called ‘federal law.’” It continued: “When a court
must decide whether the federal rule of decision will adopt state law
or fashion a nationally uniform federal common-law rule, it must adId. at 570. It is not uncommon for courts, including the Supreme Court, to cite cases
in support of a legal proposition that those cases never decided if they include similar
circumstances and actions consistent with that proposition. For a recent example, see
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. 2240, 2253 (2004), citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983), in support of the proposition that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) applies to conduct that occurred prior to its
enactment because Verlinden “involved a dispute over a contract that predated the Act”
even though Verlinden did not address FSIA’s retroactivity. Bank of the United States v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809), provides an older example of the same principle: “Those decisions are not cited as authority; for they were made without considering this particular point; but they have much weight, as they show that this point neither occurred to the bar or the bench . . . .” Id. at 88. However, judicial treatment of
“implied” holdings is scattershot. Compare Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410
U.S. 484, 498 (1973) (“[W]e have held, if only implicitly, that the petitioners’ absence
from the district does not present a jurisdictional obstacle to the consideration of the
claim.”), with Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996) (“[W]e have repeatedly held
that the existence of unaddressed jurisdictional defects has no precedential effect.”).
93
734 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
94
Id. at 376.
95
Id. at 381.
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here to the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in Kimbell.”
The court proceeded to provide a thorough analysis of the three fac97
tors set forth in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.
The Glen Ridge Court made more than one judgment that arguably resulted in the making of law; the first will suffice to illustrate. The
first question the court asked under Kimbell was whether a nationally
uniform body of law was necessary to deal with the conflict at hand.
The court stated the governing standard, based on federal court
precedent, as follows: “A nationally uniform body of common law is
crafted in those situations where its absence would threaten the functioning of those processes that the federal program is chiefly designed
98
to promote.”
Accordingly, the court proceeded to determine
whether this case involved “those processes that the [FSLIC] was
99
chiefly designed to promote.” Because no precedent addressed, let
alone established, what processes the FSLIC was “chiefly designed to
promote,” the court resolved this question without any citation of
authority. It simply resolved that the FSLIC was chiefly designed to
pay insurance to depositors, order priorities of third-party creditors,
100
sell failed thrifts, and liquidate assets of failed thrifts. The FSLIC, in
the court’s opinion, was not chiefly designed to exercise a failed
101
thrift’s power of foreclosure. A contrary judgment articulating good
reasons why exercising a failed thrift’s power of foreclosure was
among its chief processes conceivably could have been as much in line
with precedent as was the judgment that the court, in fact, made. In
future cases, however, courts that are bound to take account of Glen
Ridge will be foreclosed from making this contrary judgment.
C. What the Content of Uniform Federal Common Law Is
If a court determines that the substance of federal common law is
a uniform federal rule, it must proceed to determine what that rule is.
In doing so, state courts often must decide whether to define the
reach of a federal common law principle as limited to or extending
beyond specific circumstances of cases in which they have operated
96

Id. (citation omitted).
440 U.S. 715 (1979); see supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (describing
the Kimbell factors).
98
Glen Ridge, 734 S.W.2d at 382 (citing Int’l Union v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696, 702 (1966)).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
97
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previously. In making such decisions, state courts participate in the
development of uniform rules of federal common law. A few recent
cases are illustrative.
102
In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., the Supreme Court applied a
federal common law rule of decision that state courts subsequently
could not apply in certain cases without themselves making federal
common law. In Boyle, the Court held, as a matter of federal common
law, that a military contractor that provided helicopters to the federal
government was immune from liability for the death of a United
States Marine helicopter copilot in a crash allegedly caused by a de103
sign defect in the helicopter.
The Court explained that federal
common law will displace state law in areas involving “uniquely federal
interests” where there is a “significant conflict” between federal policy
104
In the circumstances before it, the
and the operation of state law.
Court first found “the civil liabilities arising out of the performance of
105
federal procurement contracts” to be of “uniquely federal interest.”
It found, moreover, that the “state law which holds Government contractors liable for design defects in military equipment” presented “a
106
‘significant conflict’ with federal policy and must be displaced.” In
particular, the application of state law would permit “second-guessing”
of judgments “as to the balancing of many technical, military, and
even social considerations, including specifically the trade-off between
107
greater safety and greater combat effectiveness.” Moreover, the “financial burden of judgments against the contractors would ultimately
108
be passed through, substantially if not totally, to the United States.”
Accordingly, the Court formulated the following federal common law
rule of decision:
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed,
pursuant to state law when (1) the United States approved reasonably
precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers
in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to
the United States.109

102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

487 U.S. 500 (1988).
Id. at 512.
Id. at 504-07 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 505-06 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 512.
Id. at 511 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 511-12.
Id. at 512.
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The scope of the “Boyle defense” was recently at issue in the New
110
Jersey case of Silverstein v. Northrop Grumman Corp.
In Silverstein, a
postal worker sued government contractors, alleging that a design defect in a postal vehicle that the contractors produced caused the vehi111
The contractors decle to roll over, injuring the postal worker.
fended on the ground that the court could not hold them liable
112
under Boyle.
The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court had to decide whether the Boyle defense was limited to military
contractors or extended to nonmilitary government contractors as
well. The Boyle Court, as the New Jersey court observed, “did not directly comment upon whether the government contractor defense
113
The
would be applicable in the context of nonmilitary contracts.”
New Jersey court held that the Boyle defense applied to nonmilitary
contractors by characterizing the principles underlying the defense as
extending beyond the military context: “Though government contracts for nonmilitary products do not involve considerations of combat effectiveness, all of the other policy reasons cited by the [Boyle]
Court in support of the government contractor defense are equally
114
applicable to military and nonmilitary procurements.” In particular,
the court explained, the government must have flexibility to trade
safety for economic considerations in all of its contracts; all government contractors might pass on financial burdens from litigation to
the public; and there is a risk that state tort law applied to any gov115
ernment contract will interfere with federal policy.
While this decision accords with some federal courts’ characterizations of Boyle, it contradicts other federal courts’ characterizations of
116
Boyle that limited Boyle to the military context. In In re Hawaii Federal
117
Asbestos Cases, for example, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
concerns behind the Boyle defense only apply to military contractors
that provide military equipment to the federal government, since
“[t]hese same concerns do not exist in respect to products readily
118
available on the commercial market.” Boyle did not set forth the rule
110

842 A.2d 881 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
Id. at 883.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 888.
114
Id. (alteration in original) (citing Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117,
1121-22 (3d Cir. 1993).
115
Id. at 889.
116
See id. at 888 (citing cases limiting Boyle to the military context).
117
960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992).
118
Id. at 811.
111
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of decision it formulated with sufficient specificity to indicate whether
the need to protect a military judgment regarding combat effectiveness was a necessary condition for the defense to apply, or rather one
factor that, taken together with others, was sufficient to warrant application of the defense. In determining that the availability of the Boyle
defense is not limited to military contractors providing military
equipment, the Silverstein court made a judgment that resulted in the
application of a different federal rule of decision than certain inferior
federal courts have applied. Post-Silverstein, courts bound to follow its
holding will be foreclosed from making the more restrictive judgment
that the Ninth Circuit made limiting the Boyle defense to the military
context.
119
The recent Minnesota case of Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd. provides
another example of how state courts make purportedly uniform federal rules of decision. In Johns, the Supreme Court of Minnesota applied the federal common law doctrine of successor-employer liabil120
ity. The issue before the court was whether a Title VII plaintiff who
had been awarded a judgment against her former employer could collect on it from the corporation that now held her former employer’s
121
assets. The facts of the case were novel insofar as the successor corporation had acquired the assets of the employer from an entity that
had been exonerated in the underlying litigation but had also entered
into a separate contract with the responsible party in the underlying
122
litigation to employ certain of its employees. To determine whether
there should be successor-employer liability, the Minnesota court invoked the following principle that the Supreme Court had set forth:
“Continuity of business is a key factor in determining whether an em-

119

664 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 2003) (en banc).
Id. at 297-99.
121
Id. at 293, 296-97. As an initial matter, the Minnesota court observed that the
Supreme Court had not “addressed the doctrine of successor-employer liability in a
Title VII case.” Id. at 298. The Minnesota court then proceeded to hold that in Title
VII cases the federal common law successor-employer liability doctrine that the Supreme Court had recognized in NLRA cases applies, rather than state law. Id. at 298;
see, e.g., Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 170 (1973) (addressing successor-employer liability in NLRA cases). Certain federal courts of appeals had already
extended this doctrine to Title VII in a similar way, see, e.g., EEOC v. MacMillan
Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1090 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that the successor doctrine of NLRB cases applies in Title VII cases), and the Minnesota Supreme
Court recognized this. Johns, 664 N.W.2d at 298.
122
Johns, 664 N.W.2d at 294.
120
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ployer is a successor-employer for liability purposes.” Applying this
standard, the court held, as a matter of uniform federal common law,
that a successor corporation can be held liable even though the legal
entity from which it acquired the relevant assets was exonerated in the
124
A dissenting opinion disagreed with the
underlying litigation.
court’s application of the general standard. It observed that “the federal courts . . . have never bundled together an exonerated seller of
assets with a separate management company found to have violated
125
In the dissent’s view, “[a] new legal theory has
employment laws.”
126
been created in Minnesota”—a “major new proposition.” To the extent that the Minnesota Supreme Court was the first court ever to find
that there could be “continuity of business” where the seller of assets
had been exonerated, it made a judgment that resulted in the expansion of the scope of a federal common law rule of decision.
Just as a state court can make federal common law by expansively
characterizing a federal common law principle, it can make federal
common law by restrictively characterizing such a principle. The recent
California case of Fair Political Practices Commission v. Agua Caliente
127
Band of Cahuilla Indians is illustrative. The California Fair Political
Practices Commission sued the Agua Caliente Indian tribe in California Superior Court, alleging that the tribe violated the California Political Reform Act (PRA) by failing to make certain campaign-related
disclosures. The tribe defended on the ground that it was immune
from suit under the federal common law doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity. The California court rejected this defense by discerning a
limiting principle in the federal common law doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity: “Pertinent decisions recognizing the doctrine have
concerned activities affecting tribal self-governance and economic development, not activities affecting the governance and development of
128
another sovereign.” “No case,” the court explained, “has held that a
tribe is immune from suit for activities that, instead of promoting
tribal self-governance and development, are intended to influence a

123

Id. at 299 (citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551
(1964)).
124
Id. at 298-99.
125
Id. at 302 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
126
Id. at 301.
127
No. 02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003), aff’d, Agua
Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679 (Ct. App.
2004), cert. granted, 92 P.3d 310 (Cal. 2004).
128
Id. at *5.
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129

sovereign State’s electoral and legislative processes.” By characterizing the principle underlying the federal common law doctrine of sovereign immunity as protecting only the activities that prior cases
specifically involved—namely self-governance and economic development—but citing no case limiting the application of the doctrine
on principle to those activities, the California court made a judgment
that resulted in the refinement of the federal common law doctrine of
130
tribal sovereign immunity.
From each of these examples, it is evident that state courts have
made federal common law in as real a sense as federal courts have
made it. The question is whether this practice is justified. Part II addresses whether theories that attempt to justify the making of federal
common law primarily with reference to whether federal courts have
inherent or delegated power to make it are sufficient to explain
whether and when the making of federal common law by state courts
is justified.
II. WHY INHERENT AND DELEGATED POWER THEORIES
ARE INADEQUATE TO EXPLAIN THE MAKING OF
FEDERAL COMMON LAW BY STATE COURTS
That state courts make federal common law does not in itself
demonstrate that they are justified in doing so. Several scholars have
propounded theories of federal common law that focus primarily on
federal courts; none has devoted sustained attention to the operation
of federal common law in state courts. An explicit or implicit premise
of the theories that this Part will consider is that when a federal court
is justified in making federal common law, the court is justified in
making it on the basis of the kinds of national policy considerations

129

Id.
An alternative holding of the court was that “were any federal law to extend the
doctrine of tribal immunity to state laws like the PRA, it would impermissibly conflict
with the Tenth Amendment and Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution.”
Id. at *6. The California Court of Appeal affirmed on this ground, holding that the
state’s constitutional right under the Guarantee Clause “trumps the Tribe’s common
law immunity.” Agua Caliente, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 690. At the time of this writing, the
California Supreme Court had granted review of this case. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 92 P.3d 310 (Cal. 2004). No matter how the California Supreme Court resolves this case, the trial court’s opinion will remain a useful example of how state courts—even the lowest state courts—can decide cases based on
federal common law that, in a real sense, they make.
130
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that might move Congress to enact a federal statute. Such theories
commonly attribute the operation of federal common law in state
132
The Supremacy Clause may very
courts to the Supremacy Clause.
well require state courts to apply federal common law rules of decision
that Supreme Court precedent establishes. As the first section of this
Part explains, however, the Supremacy Clause does not itself empower
state courts to make federal law in the way that Congress makes federal law. A more complete account of the operation of federal common law in state courts is necessary. Accordingly, the second section
proceeds to consider whether the reasons offered by theorists to explain whether and when the making of federal common law by federal
courts is justified are adequate to explain whether and when the making of federal common by state courts is justified. It concludes that
these reasons, specifically geared as they are toward federal courts, are
inadequate to account for the making of federal common law by state
courts.
A. The Limitations of the Supremacy Clause
Does the Supremacy Clause in itself justify the making of federal
common law by state courts? Scholars have argued that if the Supreme Court makes federal common law, which they believe it may do
in variously described circumstances, it is the supreme law of the land,
133
and state courts are bound to follow it under the Supremacy Clause.
That may well be true, as far as it goes. The Supremacy Clause provides that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of
134
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby . . . .”
The Clause obliges state courts to follow federal common law that the
Supreme Court has made, assuming that such law qualifies as law
made “in Pursuance” of the Constitution. The Clause does not, however, speak to the question of whether state courts may devise federal
law on the basis of national policy considerations. To say that state
judges “shall be bound” to law made “in Pursuance” of the Constitution—the “supreme Law of the Land”—is not to say that state judges

131

See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (discussing the kinds of purely
forward-looking policy considerations that Congress takes into account when it legislates).
132
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
133
See supra note 12 (noting such arguments).
134
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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may create the “supreme Law of the Land.” As a California Court of
Appeals recently put it, “[t]he supremacy clause tells us that federal
law trumps state law, but it does not provide textual support for adop135
Indeed, it would be strange to
tion of the law in the first place.”
read the Clause as authorizing state judges, the objects of the supremacy dictate, to create the law to which the Clause dictates they are
bound. Moreover, the Clause does not speak to whether an act of
Congress delegating legislative power to state courts to devise federal
law would be one “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution.
There may be something to infer from the Supremacy Clause
about the way in which state courts are justified in making federal
common law, if indeed they are justified in making it at all—a matter
addressed in Part III.C of this Article. Suffice it to say for now, however, that the Clause in itself does not justify state courts in making
federal common law based on their assessment of what national policy
should be.
B. Inherent and Delegated Power Theories
Scholars who understand federal courts to be justified in making
federal common law for the kinds of reasons that might move Congress to make federal law have attempted to reconcile that understanding with a Constitution that vests enumerated national lawmaking powers in Congress, leaving the remainder of lawmaking power to
the states. Their theories fall into two categories: first, theories that
argue that federal courts have inherent power to make federal common
law in certain circumstances; and, second, theories that argue that
federal courts may make federal common law when the Constitution
or Congress has delegated power to them to do so. The purpose of this
section is not to provide a general critique of these theories; it is,
rather, to analyze whether each theory by its own methodology is applicable to state courts. It warrants emphasis that none of the theories
addressed here gives sustained treatment to the operation of federal
common law in state courts. The question for consideration is
whether the principles that each articulates primarily to explain the
making of federal common law by federal courts apply as well to explain the making of federal common law by state courts. This section
concludes that none of these theories, as articulated by their propo-

135

Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Santa Rosa Indian Cmty., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d
292, 298 (2004), review granted, 2005 Cal. LEXIS 110 (Cal. Jan. 12, 2005).
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nents, is adequate to explain whether or when state courts are justified
in making federal common law.
1. Inherent Judicial Power to Make Federal Common Law
Louise Weinberg has articulated an expansive theory of federal
common law premised upon an inherent judicial power in federal
136
She analyzes the operation of federal common
courts to make it.
law in light of twelve “clusters of ideas” (including, for example,
“empowerment and interest,” “federalism,” “positivism,” and “the his137
tory”). In essence, Weinberg asserts that “[t]he judiciary must have
presumptive power to adjudicate whatever the legislature and the ex138
ecutive can act upon.”
In adjudicating such matters, she argues,
federal courts have inherent power to make federal law coordinate to
the lawmaking powers of the legislature and executive. “[T]he source
of sovereign lawmaking power,” in her view, “is the sovereign’s sphere
139
As courts are institutions of
of legitimate governmental interest.”
“coordinate powers,” they inherently have power, she claims, to
choose to make law whenever it serves the sovereign’s legitimate gov140
ernmental interests. The only limits on this power are jurisdictional.
“Courts must act, of course, within their constitutional and statutory
141
jurisdiction,” she explains, but, other than that, “there are no fun142
damental constraints on the fashioning of federal rules of decision.”
Ultimately, what justifies the making of federal common law in Weinberg’s view “is the existence of a legitimate national governmental in143
When a court is justified in making federal common law,
terest.”
under her theory, the court may make it on the basis of “national sub144
stantive policy” concerns.

136

In her view, “there are no fundamental constraints on the fashioning of federal
rules of decision.” Weinberg, supra note 7, at 805.
137
Id. at 809.
138
Id. at 813.
139
Id. at 809-10.
140
Id. at 813.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 805.
143
Id. at 813.
144
In particular, “[i]f a federal common-law remedy is withheld . . . . [or] [i]f a
federal common-law claim is fashioned . . . . [or] [i]f a federal common-law defense is
created, displacing state rights, let it be because carefully considered national substantive policy is, on balance, thought to be better served . . . .” Id. at 851 (footnote omitted).
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Weinberg’s theory of federal common law purports to cover the
145
operation of federal common law “in all courts.”
However, her
analysis focuses primarily on federal courts. What follows is an attempt to apply more fully the principles of that analysis to state courts.
If we characterize state courts to be, as Weinberg characterizes federal
courts to be, (a) federal lawmaking authorities coordinate to Congress
and the President, (b) with the power to make federal law whenever
they believe it would serve the national interest, three problems arise.
The first relates to Weinberg’s attempt to account for federalism con146
Fully extending her theory to state courts
cerns in her analysis.
would appear to defy the basic federal-state lawmaking structure that
the Constitution provides. The Constitution sets forth the federal legislative, executive, and judicial powers in Articles I, II, and III, respec147
The Tenth Amendment “reserve[s] to the States” those
tively.
148
“powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution.”
The delegation of powers in Articles I, II, and III to the federal legislature, executive, and judiciary and the reservation to the states of powers “not delegated” would appear to foreclose an argument that state
courts have an inherent power to make federal law whenever they believe it would serve national interests.
The second problem relates to Weinberg’s argument that courts
are justified in making federal common law because such lawmaking
149
If state courts may make
serves to empower the federal sovereign.
federal common law whenever they believe it would serve the national
interest, state courts would have power to make federal common law
in more expansive circumstances than those in which federal courts
would have power to make federal common law. The only extrajudicial limitation on the power of the courts of a sovereign to make the
law of that sovereign that Weinberg recognizes is the courts’ jurisdic150
tion; “no other ‘authorization’ is required.” State governments create state courts and generally control the kinds of cases in which the
powers of their courts can be exercised. Indeed, Henry Hart took it as
a constitutional maxim that “federal law takes the state courts as it

145

Id. at 827; see also Louise Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision
Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 860, 862 (1989) (asserting
that “federal common law is supreme in both sets of courts”).
146
Weinberg, supra note 7, at 814-19.
147
U.S. CONST. arts. I-III.
148
Id. amend. X.
149
Weinberg, supra note 7, at 809-14.
150
Id. at 813.
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151

finds them.” The Supreme Court has long presumed that Congress
152
As
generally lacks authority to regulate state court jurisdiction.
courts of general jurisdiction, state courts have jurisdiction over a vast
expanse of cases that fall outside the jurisdiction of federal courts. If a
state court has inherent power to choose to fashion federal rules of
decision whenever it believes that doing so would serve a “legitimate
governmental interest” of the federal government, it is a power that
state courts have far more opportunities to exercise than federal
courts have.
Under current federal jurisdictional law, state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases in which federal law does not form a part of
153
In such cases, a state court
the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.
might determine during the course of litigation that a federal rule of
decision would best serve the national interest. For example, a state
court might find that the making of a federal rule of decision serves
the national interest in a routine bike theft, divorce, or landlord/tenant case. The only ways for Congress to effectively control
the inherent power of state courts to make federal rules of decision
would be to legislate against such decisions as state courts make them,
require the Supreme Court to review cases in which state courts exercise this power, or give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases in which federal law provides the rule of decision and to mandate removal whenever it becomes apparent that federal law will be
providing a rule of decision. To recognize in fifty different state court
systems, absent such drastic federal action, greater opportunities—
and thus power—than federal courts have to choose to fashion substan-

151

Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 489, 508 (1954).
152
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 752 (1999) (explaining that Congress “may
require state courts of adequate and appropriate jurisdiction to enforce federal prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions relate to matters appropriate for the judicial
power”) (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted); Testa v. Katt, 330
U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding that Rhode Island courts must enforce a federal law the
state deemed penal but noting that the state court had “jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate this action”); Mondou v. N.Y., New
Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 56 (1912) (holding that rights of action arising under FELA are enforceable in the state courts but noting that Congress had not
attempted in FELA “to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts or to control
or affect their modes of procedure”); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876)
(holding that federal rights of action are enforceable in state court, so long as the state
court is “competent to decide rights of the like character and class”).
153
See supra note 52.
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tive national policy would not appear to empower the national sovereign.
The third problem with applying Weinberg’s analysis to state
courts is that state courts do not have adequate jurisdiction to exercise
a lawmaking power coordinate to that of Congress and the executive.
State courts, unlike Congress and the executive, lack jurisdiction to
make law that is authoritative throughout the United States. It is true
that, pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a state court judgment based upon a determination of federal law generally will be enforceable nationally against a party to the case in which such a deter154
mination is made. But inasmuch as a state is incapable of legislating
155
for the nation as a whole, a state court is incapable, whether as a
156
157
matter of territorial sovereignty or due process, of making law that

154

The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires each state to give “Full Faith and
Credit” to the “judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
There are limitations to this, however. One state, for instance, need enforce the
judgment of another state “only as ‘laws [of the enforcing forum] may permit.’” Baker
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998) (quoting McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v.
Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 325 (1839)).
155
In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914), the Supreme Court
explained:
[I]t would be impossible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond
the jurisdiction of that State and in the State of New York and there destroy
freedom of contract without throwing down the constitutional barriers by
which all the States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful authority
and upon the preservation of which the Government under the Constitution
depends. This is so obviously the necessary result of the Constitution that it
has rarely been called in question and hence authorities directly dealing with
it do not abound.
Id. at 161. For a more recent exposition of this principle, see State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), where the Supreme Court explained that “[a] State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred,” for “[a] basic principle of federalism is that each State may
make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within
its borders, and each State alone can determine what measure of punishment, if any,
to impose on a defendant who acts within its jurisdiction.” Id. at 421-22; see also BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-73 (1996) (“Alabama does not have the
power . . . to punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that had
no impact on Alabama or its residents.”).
156
See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)
(“The sovereignty of each State . . . implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its
sister States—a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
157
See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
703 n.10 (1982) (explaining that the federalism component of personal jurisdiction
“must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the
Due Process Clause”).
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creates obligations in nonparties (or even in parties with respect to
unrelated transactions or occurrences) operating within the United
States but outside the jurisdiction of that court. Though Weinberg asserts that state courts “can decide whatever federal issues properly
come before them along the whole continuum of national policy con158
cerns,” she implicitly recognizes the jurisdictional limitations of state
institutions. In defining “the sphere of legitimate national governmental interest” (i.e., the scope, in her view, of the power of federal
courts to make federal common law), she observes that “[t]he nation
159
is empowered to provide for the general welfare.” Thus, “the legislature of Pennsylvania [cannot] enact[] laws purporting to govern the
nation . . . . In the nature of things, Pennsylvania has no power to pro160
vide for the general welfare of non-Pennsylvanians.” The same logic
would apply to a state court, which has no jurisdiction beyond that
given to it by a state. Though a state court may purport to make and
apply uniform federal law in a given case, it lacks the power both to
prescribe a rule of decision that governs the entire jurisdiction of the
United States and to enforce such a rule of decision against non161
For all of these realitigants outside the jurisdiction of the state.
sons, Weinberg’s theory of federal common law, with its primary focus
on federal courts, does not on its own terms sufficiently explain
whether and when the making of federal common law by state courts
is justified.
Larry Kramer has also articulated an inherent power theory of the
making of federal common law by federal courts. He argues that the
effectiveness of such lawmaking justifies recognition of a “judicial pre162
rogative” to make federal common law whenever it is “necessary and
163
proper” to implement a congressional act. He describes the limits
of this judicial prerogative as follows: “[T]he occasion for making
federal common law must be to improve the effectiveness of a statute,

158

Weinberg, supra note 7, at 827.
Id. at 810-11 (footnote omitted).
160
Id. at 811.
161
Professor David Robertson has argued that “[w]hen a state court makes new
law, it is going to be state law no matter what the court chooses to call it.” David W.
Robertson, Displacement of State Law by Federal Maritime Law, 26 J. MAR. L. & COM. 325,
368 (1995). Henry Hart observed as well that based on the inherent limitations on
state lawmaking authority, “[i]n no view did any single state have legislative jurisdiction
to deal authoritatively with problems of maritime law generally.” Hart, supra note 151,
at 531.
162
Kramer, supra note 23, at 268.
163
Id. at 288.
159
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but the court need not locate the source of its rules ‘in’ the statute”;
rather, the “lawmaking power” of the federal courts is “broad enough
to encompass any rule consistent with the general purposes of the
165
statute on which it is based.”
The justification for this judicial pre166
rogative, as he explains it, lies in “what works.” As an empirical matter, he claims that the making of federal common law in this way is
“exceedingly useful” insofar as it: (1) expands the governing capacity
of the federal government; (2) resolves hard questions that Congress
might otherwise avoid; and (3) involves another lawmaker in the reso167
lution of societal problems. Implicit in each of these purposes is an
understanding that state courts will devise federal common law rules
on the basis of forward-looking policy considerations.
Kramer addresses the authority of only federal courts, not state
168
courts, to make federal common law. Do the principles that he applies to justify the making of federal common law by federal courts
apply as well to justify the making of federal common law by state
courts? It does not follow from the fact that the making of federal
common law by federal courts serves certain purposes that the making
of federal common law by state courts serves those same purposes.
There are fifty different state court systems. State courts generally
may have less expertise in dealing with federal law than federal courts
169
have. It is not obvious that having fifty different court systems, each
with a different jurisprudential heritage and presumably less familiarity with the fabric of federal law than federal courts, making federal
law would improve the federal lawmaking enterprise. In fact, state
courts often make federal common law differently than federal courts
make it. To the extent that Kramer’s theory describes federal common law lawmaking as a judicial prerogative of federal courts, justified
by apparent empirical effects of federal common law lawmaking by
federal courts, it does not resolve on its own terms whether recognizing a judicial prerogative in state courts to make federal common law
would be justified.
164

Id. at 289.
Id. at 288.
166
Id. at 301.
167
Id. at 270-71. Kramer acknowledges that his empirical claims cannot be
proven. Id. at 271.
168
Id. at 265.
169
See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 164-65 (1969) (“The federal courts have acquired a considerable expertness in the interpretation and application of federal law which would
be lost if federal question cases were given to the state courts.”).
165
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It could be argued that Kramer’s methodology, if not his specific
conclusions, can be applied to state courts. Under his methodology,
state courts would be justified in making federal common law if such
lawmaking served its own purposes with apparent effectiveness. An
analysis of this argument is not possible without some critique of
170
Kramer’s methodology. Unlike Weinberg, who assesses whether the
making of federal common law is justified with reference to independent metrics of analysis, Kramer purports to assess whether the
making of federal common law is justified in light of the practice as it
171
exists.
Under Kramer’s methodology, we would assess whether the
making of federal common law by state courts is “useful.” A problem
with this analysis is that it presupposes that we should assess what
courts ought to do by what is done by them with apparent effectiveness.
Kramer’s argument—that courts ought to make federal common law
because they already make federal common law in a way that effectively serves certain purposes—begs the question: are these purposes
that ought to be served?
It is not self-evident that the purposes that Kramer argues the
making of federal common law by federal courts effectively serves are
purposes that federal judicial action ought to serve. In particular, it is
not self-evident (1) that the lawmaking capacity of both courts and
Congress ought to remain as large as possible; (2) that Congress
ought to avoid deciding hard questions; or (3) that different lawmakers ought to be addressing the same problems. Indeed, arguments
172
(1) that the sphere of federal lawmaking ought to be limited; (2)
that legislatures ought to decide hard questions rather than punting
173
them to courts; and (3) that different lawmakers ought not to be
170

The purpose of this section, as explained, is not to provide a general critique of
theories of federal common law that focus primarily on federal courts; rather, it is to
analyze whether such theories apply equally well on their own terms to state courts.
Here, however, an exception is necessary.
171
See generally Weinberg, supra note 7.
172
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“The limited and enumerated powers granted to the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches of the National Government . . . underscore the vital role reserved to the States by the constitutional design . . . .” (citations omitted)).
173
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2673 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the problem with judges making what in their view constitutes good
policy “is not only that it steps out of the courts’ modest and limited role in a democratic society; but that by repeatedly doing what it thinks the political branches ought
to do it encourages their lassitude and saps the vitality of government by the people”);
see also Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1995) (arguing that the
effect of expansive judicial review on the felt responsibilities of legislators deserves se-
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making multifarious pronouncements on the same subject matter
are commonplace in legal discourse. An empirical analysis of the
making of federal common law by state courts might prove such lawmaking to serve the following purposes: biased decision making
against federal interests, systematic undermining of federal rights, or
greater confusion in the dictates of federal law. To prove that the
making of federal common law by state courts effectively serves certain
purposes does not justify the making of federal common law without a
further demonstration that those purposes are ones that it ought to
serve.
Finally, any attempt to apply Kramer’s theory to state courts would
encounter the same fundamental problem faced by Weinberg’s inherent power theory of federal common law: state courts by definition do not have adequate jurisdiction to effectively exercise federal
lawmaking power. The authority of a state court extends only so far as
its jurisdiction; state courts do not have authority to make law govern175
ing across the entire jurisdiction of the United States. For these rearious attention); Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 588-89 (1983) (observing the “danger” that “by passing the
hard questions to the courts, Congress is able to divert political pressure from itself”).
174
See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (stating the principle that
courts should refrain from deciding certain issues due to “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question”).
175
It is worth noting one other inherent power theory regarding the making of
federal common law by federal courts. Thomas Merrill invokes an inherent power
theory to justify a narrow category of federal common law lawmaking by federal courts.
See generally Merrill, supra note 7. (He recognizes other categories of such lawmaking
to be legitimate under a delegated-power theory also, as the next section explains.) See
infra note 373 (discussing this theory). In his view, federal courts have the inherent
power “to adopt their own provisions governing the conduct of litigation and internal
operations,” absent congressional action governing such matters. Merrill, supra note 7,
at 24. As a matter of the federal separation of powers, he explains, “the promulgation
of ‘house keeping’ rules that would have no impact on congressional policies is consistent with the constitutional division of powers.” Id. He addresses this theory exclusively to the power of federal courts, not state courts.
Interestingly, in practice, there are instances of state courts making federal law regarding the conduct of litigation of federal claims. The line between laws that govern
the conduct of litigation (“procedure”) and other laws (“substance”) is of course
drawn differently for different purposes and, for any purpose, not easily drawn. See
Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J.
333, 341-43 (1933) (identifying at least eight areas of law that in 1933 drew different
distinctions between “substance” and “procedure”). Consider, for example, the question of whether a court should award prejudgment interest to the prevailing party on a
federal claim. Some states consider this question to be one of procedure rather than
substance for certain purposes. See, e.g., Maddox v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 298 F.3d 694,
698 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Oklahoma courts consider prejudgment interest to be proce-
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sons, Kramer’s theory of federal common law, with its focus on federal
courts, appears inadequate to explain whether and when the making
of federal common law by state courts is justified.
2. Delegated Power to Make Federal Common Law
Rather than rely on inherent powers or judicial prerogatives,
other theories seek to justify the making of federal common law by
federal courts with reference to whether an authoritative source of law

dural only, and not a substantive right.”). See generally Dustin K. Palmer, Comment,
Should Prejudgment Interest Be a Matter of Procedural or Substantive Law in Choice-of-Law Disputes?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 705 (2002) (explaining that whether prejudgment interest is
procedural or substantive law for conflicts purposes is a debated question).
State courts, nonetheless, have made federal common law regarding the standard
for awarding prejudgment interest to the prevailing party on a federal claim. Recently,
a New Jersey court adopted a four-factor test for determining when courts should
award prejudgment interest on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Maudsley v. State,
816 A.2d 189, 212 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (instructing the trial court to apply
the test used by the Second Circuit in Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 873 (2d Cir.
1998)). The Supreme Court has set forth no such test, and inferior federal courts have
set forth different tests governing the award of prejudgment interest in § 1983 cases.
See id. at 211 (“A majority of circuit courts that have considered the issue of the availability of prejudgment interest in a § 1983 case have held that prejudgment interest is
available, although they differ over the legal basis and the proper legal standard to apply.”). If federal courts can be said to have made federal common law on this arguably
procedural matter, so too has the New Jersey court.
The claim that federal courts have inherent power to make federal common law
regarding procedural matters does not resolve the question whether state courts also
have inherent power to make federal procedural law. First, courts traditionally have
explained matters of procedure to be within the sovereign power of the forum jurisdiction. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J.
947, 980 (2001) (“[A] state has exclusive control over court ‘procedure’ even as against
the federal government.”). With the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act and the decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), uniform federal procedural
rules generally govern proceedings in federal courts. That federal courts may have inherent power to make procedural rules to fill gaps in the federal procedural fabric
does not in itself mean that state courts have the same power. Indeed, federal law
generally “takes state courts as it finds them,” Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150 (1988),
and state law generally takes federal courts as it finds them. Erie, 304 U.S. at 64 (1938)
(establishing the principle that even if state law provides the rule of decision in federal
court, the federal court may apply federal procedures to adjudicate the claim). Second, state courts do not have adequate jurisdiction to exercise an inherent power to
make federal procedural law. Interestingly, Joseph Story rejected any possibility of
state court power (including any delegated power) to interfere with federal court procedures. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1752, at 625-26 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833) (arguing that state
courts cannot have “the slightest right to interfere” with federal court procedures, “and
congress are not even capable of delegating the right to them”).
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176

has delegated to them power to make federal law.
Thomas Merrill
has argued that federal courts have power to make federal common
law “when Congress or the framers of the Constitution have conferred
power on the federal courts to fashion federal rules of decision in or177
der to round out or complete a constitutional or statutory scheme.”
Martha Field has articulated a theory of federal common law that similarly is grounded in the need for an authoritative legal source to have
enabled federal courts to make federal common law. She argues that
a court may make federal common law if it can “point to a federal en-

176

This section will focus on the theories of Thomas Merrill and Martha Field. It
is worth noting, however, that Martin Redish, who generally argues that there is no
valid federal common law, has expressed the view that there is no constitutional impediment to courts “engaging in creative lawmaking pursuant to a clear legislative
delegation.” Redish, supra note 7, at 794. He would classify such lawmaking as interpretation rather than common law lawmaking. See also id. at 798 (explaining that a legitimate category of “statutory construction consists of those statutes in which the legislature has implicitly or formally delegated to the judiciary the power to create law—in
other words, to make fundamental policy judgments”). His methodology is one of
statutory interpretation, specifically interpretation of the federal Rules of Decision Act.
The Rules of Decision Act provides: “The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply.” 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000). Redish argues that
insofar as the Rules of Decision Act sets forth four sources of law as operative in the
federal courts—the federal Constitution, federal treaties, federal Acts, and state laws—
it is illegitimate for federal courts to add a fifth source of law, namely judge-made federal common law. Redish, supra note 7, at 766-67; see also Merrill, supra note 7, at 28
(explaining that “the Rules of Decision Act appears to be a severe restriction on lawmaking by federal courts”).
This statutory analysis has curious implications for the operation of federal common law in state courts. The Rules of Decision Act by its terms governs only “the
courts of the United States”, 28 U.S.C. § 1652; it does not govern state courts. Louise
Weinberg has made this point. See Weinberg, supra note 145, at 862 (observing that
the Rules of Decision Act is “limited in application by its own language to federal courts
only”). If it is illegitimate for state courts to make federal common law, it is not by virtue of the Rules of Decision Act. The “difficult constitutional issue” that Redish’s
statutory analysis bypasses, Redish, supra note 7, at 766—whether federal common law
lawmaking is politically legitimate—is thus unavoidable as it arises with respect to state
courts. Interestingly, if it is constitutionally permissible in certain circumstances for
federal and state courts to make federal common law, the Rules of Decision Act, under
Redish’s theory, would operate to prohibit federal courts from making federal common law in those circumstances while allowing state courts to do so. In this analysis, a
litigant who sought a particular federal outcome that neither the Constitution nor a
federal statute required (according to any recognized interpretive theory) but that
federal common law might properly provide would have to pursue that outcome in
state court, not in federal court. Suffice it to say for present purposes that the Rules of
Decision Act does not resolve the question whether the making of federal common law
by state courts is legitimate.
177
Merrill, supra note 7, at 40.
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actment, constitutional or statutory, that it interprets as authorizing
178
the federal common law rule.” “Deciding whether common law can
be made in any given case,” she explains, “is a matter of interpreting
each possible enabling authority to see whether or not it supports fed179
eral common law.” Both claims view the legitimacy of federal common law to be a matter of delegated power.
In Merrill’s view, “the question of the power of federal courts to
180
make law should precede questions about the content of that law.”
For him, constitutional principles of federalism, separation of powers,
and electoral accountability require a delegation of power to federal
181
In
courts for their making of federal common law to be justified.
Field’s view, “there must be a source of authority for any given exer182
cise of federal common law power.”
“This limit,” she explains,
“flows from the proposition that authority must exist for any exercise
of federal power, coupled with the proposition that there is no enactment giving federal courts power to make common law gener183
ally.”
Merrill and Field each employ a positivistic methodology in formulating their respective theories. Merrill applies “a norm of legitimacy drawn from positive law: the existing set of legal principles that
184
participants in our legal system consider binding and authoritative.”
He explains the “fundamental elements” of this norm to be “structural
principles, embodied in the federal Constitution, that allocate law185
making powers among the branches of government.”
Field formulates her theory, too, from positive legal pronouncements. Her “‘suggested formulation’ is proposed primarily as a way of reconciling and
explaining Supreme Court pronouncements in this highly confused
area. It does not purport to improve upon what courts, in the main,
are doing, as much as to articulate what they are doing in order to re186
flect upon it.”
Merrill and Field’s theories differ significantly over when there
has been a legitimate delegation of power to federal courts to make

178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Field, supra note 6, at 887.
Id. at 928.
Merrill, supra note 7, at 11.
Id. at 12-27.
Field, supra note 6, at 899.
Id.
Merrill, supra note 7, at 8.
Id.
Field, supra note 6, at 927-28.
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federal common law. Merrill argues that a legitimate delegation must
be “specifically intended” and the scope of the delegation “reasonably
187
circumscribed.” Field takes a broader approach, one that “does not
188
in fact require any particular form of authorization.”
Her theory
leaves it to courts to decide “whether a directive is implicit in any par189
Field makes clear that when a federal court is
ticular enactment.”
authorized to make federal common law, it has broad discretion to
consider the national policy interests that Congress considers when it
190
makes law.
Merrill does not take as definite a position on how courts, authorized to make federal common law, are justified in making it. On the
one hand, he describes a delegated power in courts to construe opentextured provisions “in the manner they deem most congruent with
191
the general purposes of the enactment,” or to build upon common
192
law “through the incremental case-by-case process.”
On the other
hand, he acknowledges that “the concept of delegated lawmaking . . .
does not get around the fact that largely unguided normative judgments will have to be made by judges in the development of . . .
187

Merrill, supra note 7, at 41. Merrill distinguishes delegated lawmaking from
“preemptive lawmaking” by federal courts, which he also argues to be constitutional. A
court engages in preemptive lawmaking not when a delegation of lawmaking power is
specifically intended, but when lawmaking is necessary to protect or effectuate “specifically intended federal policies.” Id. at 36-37. For present purposes, there is no need to
distinguish his theory of preemptive lawmaking from his theory of delegated lawmaking. In either case, he views the lawmaking power to reside exclusively with Congress,
a power that federal courts may exercise only when Congress has delegated it to them.
As he explains, “[w]hen a court engages in preemptive lawmaking, it still may be said
to be carrying out the original intentions of the enacting body.” Id. at 36.
188
Field, supra note 6, at 942.
189
Id. In this regard, there is a significant inherent power component to Field’s
theory as well. On the one hand, she argues, the Constitution or Congress must enable courts to make federal common law, but, on the other hand, she argues, that
since no particular form of authorization is required, the judiciary “effectively decides
whether federal common law is appropriate under all the circumstances.” Id. Her ultimate argument is that “federal law can apply whenever federal interests require a federal solution.” Id. at 983.
190
In particular, Field states that “judicial discretion, governed by a presumption
in favor of using state law, is really the only limit on federal common law.” Id. at 950.
In the following passage, she suggests that, in making federal common law, courts
should be able to take into account many of the same considerations that Congress
takes into account when it makes federal law: “Congress, when it legislates, thus takes
into account interests other than those of its government, narrowly defined, as do state
legislatures. Courts as lawmakers should be able to do no less.” Id. at 957 (footnote
omitted).
191
Merrill, supra note 7, at 43.
192
Id. at 45.
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193

precedent.” As a general matter, it is with reference to a delegation
of legislative power that Merrill justifies whether federal courts are justified in making federal common law. It seems fair to infer that a
premise of his general thesis—that a delegation of legislative power is
what justifies the making of federal common law—is that, to some extent, federal courts will make federal common law based on the kind
of normative judgments that move Congress to make federal law.
Neither Merrill nor Field takes up at length the particular phe194
nomenon of the making of federal common law by state courts.
The question for consideration here is whether a delegation theory—
formulated narrowly (Merrill) or broadly (Field)—suffices to explain
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of federal common law lawmaking by
state courts. The analysis of this question will proceed as it has with
respect to the other theories thus far addressed: it will consider
whether these theories on their own terms are adequate to explain the
legitimacy of the making of federal common law by state courts. As
the Merrill and Field theories focus on positive legal pronouncements, so too will this analysis. Specifically, the question for consideration is whether Congress, consistent with structural constitutional
principles as evident in positive legal materials, may delegate authority
to state courts to make federal common law. As an initial matter, it is
important to keep this question distinct from two others: (1) whether
Congress may adopt state law as federal law, and (2) whether Congress
may consent to states making otherwise unconstitutional laws. Distinguishing these questions from the one at hand will bring into focus
potential constitutional problems, evident in positive legal materials,
with Congress delegating its lawmaking power to state courts.
First, the question whether Congress may delegate federal lawmaking power to state courts is distinct from the question whether
Congress may adopt state law as federal law—for example, adopt state
court procedures as federal court procedures (which Congress generally did for cases at law from 1789 until 1938), or adopt state crimes as
federal crimes in federal enclaves (which Congress continues to do

193

Id. at 72.
Each simply describes how federal common law applies in state courts by virtue
of the Supremacy Clause. Field, supra note 6, at 897; Merrill, supra note 7, at 6. Merrill
adds that his analysis is limited “to lawmaking by federal courts.” Merrill, supra note 7,
at 7 n.26.
194
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195

today). For Congress to delegate power to state courts to make federal common law is not for Congress to adopt state law as federal law.
First, the federal common law that state courts make does not
purport to be state law; it purports to be federal law. It is one thing

195

There is no question that Congress may adopt state law as federal law if Congress is adopting state law as it exists at a given point in time as federal law. A more
difficult question is whether Congress may adopt, as federal law, state law as it will develop in the future. In the Process Act of 1789, Congress directed that a federal court
should apply “the forms of writs and executions” and “modes of process” as were used
in the supreme court of the state in which it sat, Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1
Stat. 93, 93 (repealed 1792), and generally reaffirmed this directive in 1792, Act of May
8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (repealed 1872). In Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 1 (1825), Chief Justice Marshall read these acts as adopting state law as it
existed in 1789, not as it would subsequently develop. Id. at 32. To adopt state law as it
existed at a given point in time was, in his view, constitutional. To adopt state law as it
would develop in the future, however, was problematic. Chief Justice Marshall believed that an act adopting state procedural law as it would develop in the future as
governing proceedings in federal courts would be unconstitutional; in his view, it
would amount to states regulating the procedures governing federal courts. Id. at 4950. In 1872, Congress directed that federal courts must conform their procedures to
state court procedures as they may develop. Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17
Stat. 196, 197 (repealed 1934). Effectively, this meant that a state, by changing the
procedures that governed practice in its courts, would be changing the procedures
that governed practice in federal courts sitting in that state. Interestingly, the constitutionality of this dynamic conformity was never questioned in the courts, see Charles
Warren, Federal Process and State Legislation (pt. 2), 16 VA. L. REV. 546, 562-64 (1930)
(noting that the Supreme Court in 1872, 1875, and 1887 did not question the Act’s
constitutionality but rather saw it as reducing the inconvenience of having to follow
different procedures in state and federal courts of the same locality), and many examples of Congress prospectively adopting state law as federal law have developed since.
It is a federal crime, for example, to conduct a gambling business which is “a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted.” 18 U.S.C. §
1955 (2000). The Assimilative Crimes Act incorporates certain state criminal laws as
federal law governing federal enclaves within those states. 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000). It
was argued in United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958), that this dynamic incorporation of state law was an unconstitutional delegation of Congress’s legislative power
to the states. The Court rejected this argument, explaining that “[r]ather than being a
delegation by Congress of its legislative authority to the States, [the Act] is a deliberate
continuing adoption by Congress for federal enclaves of such unpre-empted offenses
and punishment as shall have been already put in effect by the respective States for
their own government.” Id. at 293-94. While the Court has never held a prospective
incorporation of state law by Congress to be unconstitutional, scholars have argued
that there are theoretical and historical considerations that render the point far from
settled. See Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination
of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND . L. REV. 1347, 1371 (1996) (noting that in Sharpnack, dissenting Justices Douglas and Black argued that “prospective adoption” of state
laws was equivalent “to an unconstitutional abdication of federal legislative authority.”); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1484-85 (2000) (explaining that one of these considerations is the
“nondelegation doctrine”).
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for Congress to adopt laws that a state properly makes within its institutional and jurisdictional competence; it is another for Congress to
empower state institutions to make law that purports to govern within
the jurisdiction of the entire United States. Federal common law by
definition purports to be law that at an appropriate level of generality
governs not only the sphere of the state’s lawmaking jurisdiction but
196
the nation as a whole.
Second, congressional delegation of power to state courts to make
federal common law is different from congressional incorporation of
state law insofar as the latter federalizes law that a state has voluntarily
made within the proper bounds of its lawmaking authority. Empowering state courts to make federal common law effectively obliges state
courts to make federal law. Merrill offers the Sherman Act as an example of a federal statute delegating power to federal courts to make
federal common law. In cases in which the Sherman Act provides the
rule of decision, he argues, Congress has empowered courts to make
federal law regarding what are lawful and unlawful “restraint[s] of
197
trade.” If the Sherman Act provides the rule of decision in a case in
federal court, the court must enforce the Sherman Act and, where
necessary, make federal law to do so. It would not be within the
court’s discretion to refuse and simply apply state law. In other words,
any delegation of power that the court receives from the Sherman Act
to make federal law is a delegation of power that the court must exercise where necessary to decide a case under the Sherman Act. The
198
same analysis applies to state courts. In Testa v. Katt, the Supreme
Court held that state courts generally cannot refuse enforcement of
federal claims. Thus, state courts must enforce the Sherman Act and,
where necessary, make federal law to do so.
Indeed, a permissive delegation of authority to state courts to
make federal common law would be nonsensical. Imagine a federal
act providing: “State and federal courts are hereby directed to make
federal common law with respect to matter X, if in their discretion
they see fit to do so.” By definition, federal common law purports to
be national in scope. If a state court had discretion to make federal

196

See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text. For example, even where federal
common law incorporates state law, and its substance thus varies from state to state, the
determination that federal common law should incorporate state standards purports to
be a uniform federal determination.
197
Merrill, supra note 7, at 44 (quoting Sherman Antitrust Act, Pub. L. No. 103325, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7)).
198
330 U.S. 386 (1947).
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common law, the choice to make it would not operate as a choice to
make law governing within the jurisdiction of the United States because other courts might exercise their discretion to choose not to
make federal common law. If Congress in fact has delegated power to
state and federal courts in the Sherman Act to make federal law regulating restraints of trade, it would defy the federal prohibition against
unlawful restraints of trade for a court to refuse to exercise the power
on the ground that the delegation is “permissive.”
In contrast, congressional adoption of state law is adoption of law
that a state has voluntarily chosen to make. The fact that a delegation
of authority to make federal common law would be a mandate to a
state court to make law purporting to impose obligations throughout the
jurisdiction of the United States distinguishes such a delegation from the
adoption by Congress of a state law that a state voluntarily has made
and that purports to impose obligations only within the jurisdiction of the
state. The significance of this distinction will become evident below.
The question whether Congress may delegate power to state
courts to make federal common law is also distinct from the question
whether Congress may consent to states making laws that otherwise
would be unconstitutional. The consent question has arisen most famously with respect to state laws that impose burdens on interstate
199
commerce. In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall famously rejected in dicta the argument that the first Congress had con200
sented to states regulating pilots in their ports. Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that “Congress cannot enable a state to legislate” when
the Constitution prohibits state legislation because Congress cannot
201
“delegate” its legislative powers to the states.
Notwithstanding the clarity of Marshall’s views in this regard, it
has since become settled that Congress may enable states to regulate
commerce in a way that would be unconstitutional absent such con202
203
gressional action.
In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, the
Court addressed whether a South Carolina tax on foreign insurance
companies that presumably would have violated the dormant Com199

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Id. at 116-17 (citing Act of Aug. 7, 1789, § 4, 1 Stat. 54).
201
Id.
202
See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1982) (“It
is indeed well settled that Congress may use its powers under the Commerce Clause to
‘[confer] upon the States an ability to restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they
would not otherwise enjoy.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980))).
203
328 U.S. 408 (1946).
200
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merce Clause absent congressional authorization was constitutional
204
The Court held
on the ground that Congress had authorized it.
that the tax was constitutional on the broad grounds that Congress
may exercise the commerce power “alone . . . or in conjunction with
205
coordinated action by the states.” As scholars have pointed out, the
Prudential Court effectively rejected Marshall’s reasoning in Gibbons,
recognizing that Congress may consent, even prospectively, to state
regulation of something that otherwise would be the proper object of
206
congressional regulation alone.
If Congress delegates authority to state courts to make federal
common law, is Congress merely consenting to states making laws that
otherwise would be unconstitutional? At first glance, it might appear
that it is. If delegation theorists of federal common law are correct
that the federal lawmaking power generally resides in the first instance with Congress, not the courts, it would seem to violate constitutional federalism principles for state courts to make federal law on
their own; nonetheless, if Congress delegates its lawmaking power to a
state court, the constitutional infirmity, it might appear, is cured. The
matter, however, is not this simple.
First, the cases recognizing that Congress may allow states to restrict the flow of interstate commerce involved legal restrictions that
the states imposed within their own jurisdiction to regulate. In Gibbons, New York was not attempting to regulate pilots within the jurisdiction of the entire United States; it was regulating them within the
207
jurisdiction of New York. In Prudential, South Carolina was not imposing a tax on insurance companies doing business throughout the
jurisdiction of the United States; it was taxing those seeking to do
208
business in South Carolina. It is true that the Dormant Commerce
Clause problem with each law was that it imposed a burden on out-ofstate actions. These were burdens, however, that resulted from the
operation of a law that purported to impose obligations only on those
whom the state had jurisdiction to regulate. Thus, the question in
both cases was whether a state had properly made state law. The dele-

204

Id. at 410-12.
Id. at 434, 436.
206
See Amar, supra note 195, at 1375 (arguing that Congress has the power to
authorize states to regulate when it has the power to regulate alone); William Cohen,
Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old
Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387, 400 (1983) (same).
207
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 4 (1824).
208
Prudential, 328 U.S. at 411 nn.1-2.
205
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gation question is whether Congress may authorize state institutions to
make law that purports to impose obligations on individuals and relating to activities within the jurisdiction of the United States as a whole.
Second, congressional authorization to states to make laws that
the Constitution otherwise forbids them from making is not a congressional mandate to states to make law; it is permission that they
may make law. If Congress delegates authority to state courts to make
federal common law, state courts have no choice but to make it when
necessary to decide a case that they have a constitutional duty to decide. That a delegation of authority to make federal common law
would be a mandate to state courts to make law purporting to impose
obligations within the jurisdiction of the United States distinguishes such a
delegation from congressional consent to states voluntarily making
laws that impose obligations that are within the regulatory jurisdiction of
the state.
These distinctions are significant. Consider first the notion of
Congress delegating to state courts legislative power to make law that
purports to be governing law throughout the entire jurisdiction of the
United States. This would be the functional equivalent of Congress
creating fifty commissions (state courts) to regulate interstate commerce in certain respects throughout the United States, each having
authority to enforce its regulations only with respect to certain transactions and none having authority to enforce its regulations within the
jurisdiction of the entire United States. One super-commission (the
Supreme Court) would have discretion to revise any such regulations
in a way that would create national uniformity should an individual
with standing ask it to do so.
If there is any such thing as an unconstitutional delegation of
congressional power, this might qualify. Chief Justice Marshall made
clear in Gibbons v. Ogden his view that Congress could not delegate its
209
powers back to the states. As William Cohen has observed, “[m]ost
of the cases permitting Congress to validate unconstitutional state laws
have been careful to avoid the uncomfortable conclusion that Con210
gress can directly delegate power to the states.” In the early twentieth century, the Court twice held that federal laws permitting state
regulation of matters that maritime law otherwise governed were un211
constitutional. It explained that “Congress cannot transfer its legis209

Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 33-34.
Cohen, supra note 206, at 395.
211
See Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 228 (1924) (holding unconstitutional a state law which altered “maritime rights and obligations” within that
210
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lative power to the states—by nature this is nondelegable.”
Of
course, since 1935 the Supreme Court has not struck down a federal
statute as an unconstitutional delegation of power under the “intelli213
gible principle” test. That said, a congressional delegation of power
to the courts of fifty different states, each incapable of enforcing the
“uniform” national law that it was required to create, would qualify as
one of the more eccentric delegation schemes enacted in the last
eighty years. At a minimum, such a scheme would give rise to a constitutional delegation question warranting very serious examination.
There is a second constitutional question to which a congressional
delegation of power to state courts to make federal common law
would give rise: would such a delegation be an unconstitutional
commandeering of state institutions by Congress? As explained, a
delegation of authority to state courts to make federal common law is
a mandate that they in fact make it. There has been no question since
214
1947, when the Supreme Court decided Testa v. Katt, that under the
Supremacy Clause state courts generally must enforce claims arising
under federal law; in the Court’s words, state courts may not “deny en215
forcement to claims growing out of a valid federal law.” The principle that state courts must enforce valid federal claims does not necessarily imply, however, that Congress may require state courts to
exercise a delegated federal legislative power to make the law that
governs them.
The Court’s recent anti-commandeering cases—New York v. United
216
217
States and Printz v. United States —suggest that there may be limits
on congressional authority to require state courts to make federal law.

state); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1920) (holding as “beyond the power of Congress” an act designed to apply state worker’s compensation
laws to harm occurring under maritime jurisdiction). Both of these cases have been
superseded by the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§
901-44. Guilles v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 12 F.3d 381, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1993).
212
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 253 U.S. at 164; see also W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. at 227
(“Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend, or revise the maritime law by
statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment. This power . . . may
not be delegated to the several states.”).
213
See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996) (“Though in 1935 we
struck two delegations for lack of an intelligible principle, we have since upheld, without exception, delegations under standards phrased in sweeping terms.” (citations
omitted)).
214
330 U.S. 386 (1947).
215
Id. at 394.
216
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
217
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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In New York, the Court held unconstitutional a congressional act that
required states to take title to radioactive waste generated within their
218
The
borders if they failed to make laws providing for its disposal.
Court explained that “the Constitution simply does not give Congress
the authority to require the States to regulate. The Constitution instead gives Congress the authority to regulate matters directly and to
219
pre-empt contrary state regulation.” The Court recognized in New
York the “well established power of Congress to pass laws enforceable in
220
state court,” citing Testa and other cases. “These cases,” however, as
the New York Court characterized them, “involve no more than an application of the Supremacy Clause’s provision that federal law ‘shall be
221
“More
the supreme Law of the Land,’ enforceable in every State.”
to the point,” the Court continued, “all involve congressional regulation of individuals, not congressional requirements that States regu222
late.”
That Congress may pass laws regulating individuals that state
courts must enforce does not mean that Congress may pass laws requiring state courts to set federal policies for the regulation of individuals. Imagine that Congress, to cure the constitutional infirmity
that the New York court identified, created a cause of action for an injunction enforceable only in state court in favor of any citizen against
any generator of radioactive waste within the state, to be governed by
reasonable standards of liability that the state court would create.
Such an act, requiring state courts rather than state legislatures to
regulate radioactive waste, would not necessarily have cured the constitutional infirmity that the New York Court identified.
In Printz, the Court held unconstitutional a congressional act requiring local law enforcement officials to conduct background checks
223
on prospective purchasers of handguns.
The Court explained that
for the same reason that Congress may not order states to legislate, it
may not order “the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivi224
sions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.” The
Court was careful in Printz to distinguish congressional power with respect to state executives from congressional power with respect to
218
219
220
221
222
223
224

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 149.
Id. at 178.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
Id. at 935.
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state judges. The Court characterized Testa as standing for “the
proposition that state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law—a
conclusion mandated by the terms of the Supremacy Clause (‘the
225
Judges in every State shall be bound [by federal law]’).” The Court
explained, additionally, that “the Constitution was originally understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce
federal prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions related to matters
226
To say that Congress may reappropriate for the judicial power.”
quire state courts to “apply” or “enforce” federal law in cases over
which the state court has jurisdiction, however, is not to say that Congress may require state courts to “make” federal law, at least in the way
that Congress makes it.
Indeed, there is language in Testa itself suggesting that there are
limits on Congress’s authority to use state courts to enforce federal
claims. The Court confined its holding in Testa—that state courts
must enforce federal claims—to circumstances in which state courts
“have jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local
227
It may be the case that a state
law to adjudicate” a federal claim.
court lacks the jurisdiction or authority under state law to exercise a
delegated federal legislative power. Consider, for example, the legal
system of Louisiana, which has strong roots in the civil law tradition.
Under Article I of the Louisiana Civil Code, “[t]he sources of law are
228
legislation and custom.” “Judicial decisions,” the Supreme Court of
Louisiana has explained, “are not intended to be an authoritative
229
source of law in Louisiana.”
“Consequently, Louisiana courts have
frequently noted that our civilian tradition does not recognize the
230
doctrine of stare decisis in our state.” While a consistent judicial practice can give rise to a custom in Louisiana, a “single decision” cannot
231
constitute binding law. The Louisiana Supreme Court has thus described it as “undeniably true that ‘[t]he decisions of our state courts
do not create or eliminate substantive rights as this is the proper func232
As the Fifth Circuit has explained it,
tion of the legislature.’”
225

Id. at 928-29 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2).
226
Id. at 907 (second emphasis added).
227
Testa, 330 U.S. at 394.
228
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. I (West 2000).
229
Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128 (La. 2000).
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., 783 So. 2d 1251, 1260 (La. 2001) (quoting Tullier v. Tullier, 464 So. 2d 278, 282 (La. 1985)).

2005]

STATE COURTS AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW

875

“[u]nder Louisiana’s Constitution, the power to make substantive laws
is vested exclusively in the legislature. Under the state’s constitution
and Civil Code, Louisiana courts cannot make law but are bound to
decide cases according to their best understanding of the law estab233
lished by legislation and custom.”
If a state’s courts have no power to make law under the state’s
constitution and laws, there is a serious constitutional question
whether Congress may order them to exercise a federal legislative
power when they adjudicate federal claims. Testa, New York, and Printz
stand at most for the proposition that state courts must enforce federal law regulating individuals; they say nothing that would exempt a
congressional command that state courts make laws regulating individuals from the anticommandeering principles that New York and
234
Printz set forth.
For present purposes, there is no need to get to the bottom of
whether congressional delegations of legislative power to state courts
would be unconstitutional acts of commandeering state institutions or
unconstitutional delegations of federal legislative power to state institutions. There is a preliminary matter that obviates the need to exhaustively consider these difficult constitutional questions here: there
is no evidence that Congress ever has enacted such a scheme of delegation. Neither Merrill nor Field identifies any federal statute expressly delegating power to state courts to make federal common
235
law. Rather, each recognizes that congressional authorizations that
233

Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1999). The reality of
whether courts in Louisiana “make” no law may be quite different. See Albert Tate, Jr.,
The ‘New’ Judicial Solution: Occasions for and Limits to Judicial Creativity, 54 TUL. L. REV.
877, 913 (1980) (arguing that judicially crafted solutions should be based on Louisiana
statutes and constitutional concerns rather than on stare decisis); Albert Tate, Jr., The
Role of the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions: The Louisiana Experience, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL
DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS 23, 23 (Joseph
Dainow ed., 1974) (explaining that Louisiana judges do not function as “traditional
civilian judge[s]” do).
234
Indeed, the Court recently left open the possibility that there may be other
limitations as well on the authority of Congress to regulate state courts in the service of
federal policy. See Jinks v. Richland County, 123 S. Ct. 1667, 1672 (2003) (reserving
judgment on the question of whether Congress has authority to regulate state court
procedures in state law cases); Bellia, supra note 175, at 950 (questioning Congress’s
authority to regulate state court procedures in state law cases).
235
Merrill points out that express congressional delegations of lawmaking authority to state courts are rare, Merrill, supra note 7, at 42, citing as one example Federal
Rule of Evidence 501, which provides that in federal question cases, “the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed
by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience.” Field notes that “no Justice
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legitimate a court’s making federal common law will almost always be
236
implied.
It is not a fair inference that a federal statute that has gaps, opentextured provisions, or language that captures a common law standard
delegates to the courts of fifty different states legislative power to
make federal law. First, as a matter of plain textual meaning, it would
seem strange to infer from a federal statute with open-ended provisions a congressional intent that fifty different court systems legislate
federal law that none has power to enforce nationally. Second, as a
matter of specific interpretive principles, it is significant that a determination that Congress has authorized state courts to make federal
237
law is a determination that federal law so made preempts state law.
The Supreme Court has held that express preemption occurs only
238
when it is the “‘clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” The “‘task
of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain
wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of
239
The Court also has “‘recognized
Congress’ pre-emptive intent.’ ”
that a federal statute implicitly overrides state law either when the
scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusively, or when state law is in actual conflict with fed240
eral law.’”
Whether preemption is express or implicit, it is federal
law—a law that at some level of generality operates uniformly
throughout the United States—that preempts state law. The very nature of federal law would seem to preclude any inference from a statute with gaps or open-textured provisions that, in enacting them,

has . . . advocat[ed] a specific intent standard.” Field, supra note 6, at 945. Furthermore, she argues that, even if such a standard were adopted, the impractical nature of
a specific congressional intent requirement would lead to a list of exceptions consuming the rule. Id.
236
See Field, supra note 6, at 942 (stating that the judiciary “decid[es] whether a
directive is implicit in any particular enactment”); Merrill, supra note 7, at 42 (noting
that “[i]mplied delegated lawmaking is much more common” than express delegation).
237
See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (“[W]e have held
that a few areas, involving ‘uniquely federal interests,’ are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted and
replaced . . . by federal law of a content prescribed . . . by the courts—so-called ‘federal
common law.’” (citation omitted)).
238
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
239
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2002) (quoting CSX Transp.,
Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)).
240
Id. at 64 (citation omitted) (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280,
287 (1995)).
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Congress intended state law to be preempted by a “federal” law that
state courts are to make according to their views of what the national
interest requires. If Congress intends state law to be preempted by a
federal law that each state court will make as an adjunct federal legislature, it is fair to expect a clear manifestation of Congress’s intent
that that is to be the case.
In sum, an inference that when Congress enacts an open-ended
provision it intends fifty state court systems to purport to make uniform national law on the basis of what national policy should be, law
that no state is capable of enforcing as federal law and the Supreme
Court may never see fit to unify, is unwarranted. Even were such an
inference warranted or such a delegation made express by Congress,
there is a strong case to be made, in light of recent Supreme Court
precedent, that Congress may not require state courts to exercise federal legislative power. For these reasons, delegation theories of federal common law appear inadequate under their own positivistic
methodology to fully explain whether and when the making of federal
common law by state courts is justified.
*
*
*
From this analysis of inherent and delegated power theories, we
see that a general problem with recognizing in state courts a power to
make “federal” law is that the law that a state court makes, no matter
what the state court calls it, operates only so far as the state’s jurisdiction to regulate and enforce its regulations. What, then, if anything,
justifies a state court in making federal common law? Is the answer
that state courts in reality can make only state law, not federal law, no
matter what they call it? The answer is not that simple. Just as real as
the fact that the “federal” law that state courts make operates only
within the jurisdiction of the state is the fact that a “federal” determination of law by a state court is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The
question of when, if ever, state courts are justified in making federal
common law accordingly has serious implications for the respective
roles of the Supreme Court and Congress in the federal lawmaking
enterprise.
III. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATE COURTS
IN MAKING FEDERAL COMMON LAW
This Part offers an analysis of when, if ever, the making of federal
common law by state courts is justified. Most theories of federal
common law proceed by explaining as a matter of constitutional prin-
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ciple when courts may or may not exercise a legislative-type authority
to make federal common law. This has not proven to be an easy task:
the issues are complex, there is no specific constitutional text on the
matter, and inferences from the constitutional structure are not easily
reconcilable with other inferences that courts have drawn from the
constitutional structure in resolving other issues. Accordingly, it may
be necessary for courts to make federal law in a real sense, even at the
level of identifying a constitutional principle governing when they
may make law. An analysis of the authority of courts to make federal
common law should attempt to reconcile the quest for constitutional
principles governing the authority of courts to make federal common
law with the reality that it may be necessary for courts to make federal
law even at the level of identifying such constitutional principles. An
argument that it would be appropriate for courts to make a legislativetype judgment establishing a constitutional principle that courts may
or may not make legislative-type federal common law is not likely to
succeed. In most instances, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
prove that the constitutional principle established by a legislative-type
judgment is the right principle as opposed to other constitutional
principles that might result from legislative-type decision making. Of
course, the theories of federal common law that the last Part discusses
all purport to be right.
To avoid these difficulties, it is necessary to recognize that it does
not follow from the fact that in certain cases judges in a real sense
make law that they must make it on the basis of legislative-type policy
judgments. There is another manner in which judicial decisions may
make law—indeed, the manner in which judicial decisions generally
appear to make law—that far more easily comports with the Constitution than the legislative manner. This Part explains what that manner
is and how it accords with the Constitution. First, this Part explains
that it is necessary for state courts to make federal common law in order to render any decision in certain cases that they have a constitutional duty to resolve, including certain cases in which they turn to
state law to fill gaps in federal regulatory schemes. Second, it explains
the manner in which state courts historically have appeared to make
“the law of the land” in cases that today courts describe as governed by
federal common law. This manner is qualitatively different from the
legislative-type manner upon which scholars have premised their
analyses of federal common law. Third, it explains why this manner of
judicial lawmaking better comports with the Supremacy Clause than
the legislative-type manner. Finally, it explains that this manner of ju-
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dicial lawmaking comports with certain normative considerations
about how courts can and generally ought to make law. To bring
these matters into focus, this Part begins with a case study.
A. A Case Study
Suppose that a plaintiff has a right of action arising under a federal statute against a defendant. Before the plaintiff files suit, the defendant dies. The federal statute is silent regarding whether claims
arising under it may be brought against a defendant’s estate. May the
plaintiff pursue a federal claim against the defendant’s estate? This
question has arisen in state and federal courts since the time of the
Founding. Consider how one state court and one federal court resolved this issue early in the Union and how one state court and one
federal court resolved this issue more recently.
241
Consider first Franklin v. Low, an 1806 case decided by the Supreme Court of New York. Franklin mailed a letter containing several
hundred dollars’ worth of bank notes at the federal post office in New
York. A postal clerk opened the letter and stole the money. Franklin
brought an action in assumpsit against the estate of the deceased
postmaster of New York City for recovery. Franklin’s counsel characterized the case as one of “first impression, arising under the act of
242
congress for the establishment of the post-office.”
An act of Congress set forth general duties of postmasters and further required the
Postmaster General to give postmasters “instructions relative to their
243
The Postmaster General of the United States gave all postduty.”
masters instructions that each “was to be answerable for the fidelity
244
and care of every person employed by him.” The Supreme Court of
New York framed the issue for decision as follows: “[W]hether any
suit can be maintained against the representatives of a deceased
postmaster, for the embezzlement of money by a clerk in the office, by
taking the same out of a letter deposited in the office for transporta245
tion by the mail.”
The court held that the suit could not be maintained, drawing a
distinction that Lord Mansfield drew in the English case of Hambly v.

241
242
243

1 Johns. 396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806).
Id. at 397.
An Act to Establish the Post-Office of the United States, ch. 43, § 1, 1 Stat. 733

(1799).
244
245

Franklin, 1 Johns. at 397.
Id. at 402.
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246

Trott:
the plaintiff could recover against an estate only if the deceased defendant personally benefited from the injury that the plaintiff suffered, but not if the defendant’s liability arose merely ex delicto
247
In this regard, the court found the deter(from a wrong or tort).
minative issue to be whether the proper form of action for bringing
this case would require a plea of “not guilty” by the defendant, for, if it
would, that would signify “that the guilt of a deceased person is tried;
248
The court determined that
and that the assets are not benefited.”
the plaintiff could maintain an action in assumpsit, an action which
would not have required a plea of not guilty, only if there was an actual gain to the deceased defendant from the clerk’s misfeasance. As
there was no such actual gain, assumpsit was unavailable. Accordingly,
the defendant’s liability could only arise ex delicto, and the action did
not survive. The opinion of the court concluded with a broader jurisprudential statement: “Whether originally the law was wisely established, is not for me to inquire; it is sufficient for me that it is estab249
lished, and that we are bound to pronounce it.”
A federal court addressed a similar issue in 1829 in United States v.
250
Korn.
In Korn, the United States brought an action to recover a
penalty from the estate of a deceased defendant pursuant to a federal
revenue law. The only question before the court was “whether an action for the recovery of it may be maintained against his adminis251
trator.” The court held that the action could not be maintained, as
“[t]he English cases are uniform, confirmed by several in our own
country, particularly in New York, that actions founded in tort or mis252
feasance, and arising ex delicto, die with the person.”
Now consider two relatively recent cases, one decided in federal
court and one in state court, in which similar questions arose, namely,
246

98 Eng. Rep. 1136 (1776).
Franklin, 1 Johns. at 403.
248
Id. When the general issue to be tried upon a form of action, such as trespass,
was “guilty or not guilty,” the only issue tried was whether the defendant committed
the wrong that the specific form of action was fit to remedy. Whether the defendant
benefited therefrom was not relevant. See HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE
PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 178 (London, Joseph Butterworth &
Son1824) (explaining that “in Trespass, the general issue, not guilty, evidently amounts
to the denial of the trespasses alleged, and no more”); JOSEPH STORY, A SELECTION OF
PLEADINGS IN CIVIL ACTIONS 599 (Boston, Carter & Hendee, 2d ed. 1829) (providing
an example of the plea of not guilty upon the general issue in a trespass action).
249
Franklin, 1 Johns. at 403.
250
26 F. Cas. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1829) (No. 15,543).
251
Id. at 815.
252
Id.
247

2005]

STATE COURTS AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW

881

whether particular federal claims survived the death of the defendant.
253
In the 1997 case of Epstein v. Epstein, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York addressed whether a plaintiff
may bring a right of action arising under the federal Racketeer Influ254
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against the estate of a
deceased defendant. One member of the Epstein family brought suit
against the estate of his brother (and others) alleging that the brother
siphoned funds from the family business into personal ventures in violation of RICO. The issue before the court was whether a RICO claim
survives the defendant’s death, “an arguably unsettled issue of law” in
255
In framing the issue, the court explained that neithe court’s view.
ther RICO nor any other federal statute “specifically addresses
256
whether a private civil claim survives a party’s death.” “Accordingly,”
the court explained, “the issue is governed in the first instance by
principles of federal common law.”257 The court recited federal common law precedent “that a claim survives a party’s death if it is ‘re258
medial’ rather than ‘punitive.’” The estate argued that this issue—
whether a RICO claim is remedial or punitive—should be determined
259
case by case pursuant to a multifactor balancing test.
The court rejected this approach on the grounds that “the prescribed factors in such tests are both numerous and unweighted,” and
thus “they provide a facade behind which a court can reach almost
any result without appearing to depart from the application of the
260
test.” The court preferred, rather, a bright-line rule that civil RICO
actions survive the death of the defendant because in all cases such
claims are remedial. The court reasoned that Congress’s “purpose in
creating RICO’s private right of action was to provide victims with a
261
remedy.” RICO, the court explained, was modeled on damage provisions in the antitrust law that courts have deemed “remedial.”
Moreover, in other contexts, federal courts had “described RICO’s
262
private right of action as remedial in nature.” The court concluded:
253
254

966 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-

1968).
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262

Epstein, 966 F. Supp. at 260.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 260-61 (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980)).
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id. at 262.
Id.
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“By operation of settled principles of federal common law, it follows a
263
fortiori that such claims survive a [defendant’s] demise . . . .”
264
In the 1991 case of Bank of Northern Illinois v. Nugent, the issue of
whether a civil RICO claim survives the death of the defendant came
before an Illinois appellate court. The plaintiff bank in Nugent had
extended credit to an automobile leasing company, and Nugent and
265
others had provided personal guarantees. The bank brought an action against Nugent’s estate and others alleging that certain of the defendants had caused the company to use funds in a manner contrary
to the terms of the loan agreement, violating RICO. An issue in the
case was whether a civil RICO action “survive[s] the death of the al266
leged wrongdoer.” In framing the issue, the court explained: “The
RICO statute contains no provision regarding survival or abatement of
a cause of action brought under it. Since there is no applicable general Federal statute, Federal common law governs the survival of a
267
Under federal common law, the court explained, “a
RICO claim.”
determination of whether a civil RICO action is penal or remedial is
268
necessary to resolve this issue.” The court proceeded to cite several
federal district court cases that had “decided this issue” and to explain
that “these decisions are not uniform, and there is clearly a split
269
among districts.”
The court went on, however, to distinguish all of these cases as
“factually inapposite” to the one before it: “[T]he cases cited above
address the issue of whether a claim for treble damages under RICO
may be assessed against an estate for conduct only of the decedent
during his lifetime. In this case, the complaint alleged fraudulent
270
conduct both before and after decedent Nugent’s death.” Without
further discussion, the court found that the estate’s defenses to the
RICO claim against it should be dismissed because they “lack[ed]
271
merit” and were “unavailing.”

263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271

Id. at 263 (first emphasis added).
584 N.E.2d 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
Id. at 951.
Id. at 958.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 959.
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Each of these cases was decided on the basis of a rule of decision
272
that would qualify today as “federal common law.”
Some of them,
too, in a real sense made federal common law. In Franklin, the New
York court made a judgment about the legal materials upon which it
relied that was one among other valid judgments that it could have
made based on the precedents it considered. In determining whether
“the form of action requires a plea of not guilty”—the question determinative of whether the action arose ex delicto—the court relied on
its “recollection” that there was no instance of assumpsit being
brought in similar circumstances and in fact concluded that assumpsit
273
could not be brought because there was no gain. A dissenting judge
concluded that assumpsit could lie against a testator even where he
had realized no gain if there was a contract from which he might have
274
Neither
gained, which the dissenting judge concluded there was.
the court nor the dissent cited any case with which the other’s reason275
ing was inconsistent, presumably because none was available.
Rather, each endeavored to explain only that its reasoning was in line
with prior precedent. The court explained, “[t]here is not, in my recollection, an instance of assumpsit having been brought in a case like
276
The dissent explained that assumpsit properly could
the present.”
lie “[w]ithout . . . interfering with any adjudged case” and “consis277
tently, too” with Hambly. If it were true before Franklin that the dissent’s judgment would have been consistent with prior precedent, it
was no longer true after Franklin. In this sense, the Franklin Court
made law. The judgment that the court made (that “no action would
lie on an assumpsit”) resulted in the application of a rule of decision
(that no “suit can be maintained against the representatives of a de-

272

At the time that Franklin was decided, “federal common law” was a meaningless
term; rather, general principles of law occupied some of the field that federal common
law occupies today, including the question presented in Franklin of whether personal
actions survived the death of the defendant. See infra notes 295-305 and accompanying
text (discussing the role of such principles).
273
Franklin v. Low, 1 Johns. 396, 402 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806).
274
Id. at 405 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
275
The analysis of each case here will assume that the precedent the court considered was the most relevant precedent to the issue before it. It is conceivable that there
was precedent that the court did not consider that, fairly read in light of the precedent
it did consider, compelled either the determination the court made or one it did not
make. But it also is conceivable that no such precedent existed. For purposes of showing that more than one determination can be justifiable in light of existing precedent,
it will suffice to proceed on the assumption that no such precedent existed.
276
Franklin, 1 Johns. at 402.
277
Id. at 405 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
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ceased postmaster, for the embezzlement of money by a clerk in the
office, by taking the same out of a letter deposited in the office for
278
transportation by the mail”) with which the dissent’s judgment
would from thenceforth be inconsistent and accordingly foreclosed in
courts bound to rule in accordance with Franklin’s holding.
In Korn, on the other hand, the court made no apparent judgment that resulted in any real sense in the making of law. Neither the
court nor the parties in Korn perceived that any different sources of
law or legal principles applied to the question presented than those
that the New York court applied in Franklin, or that the action for a
penalty arose in any way other than ex delicto. The court’s application
of the principle that “actions founded in tort or misfeasance, and aris279
ing ex delicto, die with the person” did not involve any apparent
judgment that would alter the way in which future courts bound to
follow Korn could read the precedents upon which Korn relied.
The same cannot be said, however, of the two more recent precedents, Epstein and Nugent. The Epstein court applied Supreme Court
precedent that a claim survives “if it is ‘remedial’ rather than ‘puni280
tive.’” In doing so, however, it observed that “terms like ‘remedial’
281
and ‘punitive’ are neither self-defining nor mutually exclusive.” The
court proceeded to make certain judgments in its analysis that,
though apparently in line with Supreme Court precedent, were not
the only judgments that the court could validly have made. For example, the court had to decide whether courts should resolve the remedial-punitive issue according to a case-by-case balancing test or a
bright-line rule for all civil RICO cases. Its decision to employ a
bright-line test seems generally consistent with Supreme Court precedent (the Supreme Court articulates rules of decision that apply to
general categories of claims too regularly to warrant citation), and was
based on a reason seemingly sound in light of existing federal law (a
bright-line rule, according to the Epstein court, would generate the
certainty that this context warranted and accord with discernable con282
gressional purpose).

278

Id. at 402.
United States v. Korn, 26 F. Cas. 815, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1829) (No. 15,543).
280
Epstein v. Epstein, 966 F. Supp. 260, 260-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
281
Id. at 261.
282
See id. at 261-62 (“Congress’ silence . . . cannot reasonably be read as a warrant to the courts to fashion unprecedented multi-factor case-specific tests of [this]
kind . . . .”).
279
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A judgment to balance case by case, however, also could have
been consistent with Supreme Court precedent (the Supreme Court
has required balancing with respect to other federal common law
283
standards) and based on a sound reason in light of existing federal
law (it is conceivable that some RICO claims could be more punitive
or remedial than others, and that only a fact-intensive inquiry would
determine whether survival in the given case would best serve discernable congressional purposes). The bright-line rule of decision that
the court applied—RICO claims survive the death of the defendant in
all cases—precludes future courts that must decide in accordance with
its holding from balancing the remedial and punitive considerations
in the factual context of a particular case. In this sense, the court
284
made federal common law.
The Nugent court also made federal common law in this sense. It
distinguished the case before the court from several federal cases addressing the RICO survivability issue on the ground that the complaint alleged predicate conduct occurring both before and after the
decedent’s death. It cited no precedent for this distinction, nor did it
provide any reason why the distinction should make a difference.
Rather, it summarily concluded that the distinction rendered the estate’s defense that the RICO claim did not survive meritless. Assuming that no Supreme Court holding compelled this decision (or the
court would have cited it), it may not have been the only justifiable
decision that the court could have made in light of Supreme Court
precedent. It is not self-evident why the fact that other defendants
engaged in predicate conduct after the defendant’s death should justify recovery against the defendant’s estate, especially if RICO is understood to be “punitive” in nature, an open question in the case. To
the extent that Nugent forecloses courts bound to account for its holding from making the determination (seemingly valid at the time Nugent was decided) that some or all RICO claims do not survive even if
predicate conduct occurred after the defendant’s death, Nugent made
new law.
What, if anything, justified the state courts in Franklin and Nugent
in making purportedly nationally uniform law? Is it something differ-

283

See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing Axess case).
Even though this was a trial court decision, the rule of decision it enforced is
authoritative with respect to individuals subject to the jurisdiction of the court; it also is
binding on courts that must rule in accordance with its decision, such as the bankruptcy courts of the district.
284
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ent from what, if anything, justified the federal court in Epstein in
making federal common law?
B. The Necessity that State Courts Make Federal
Common Law in Certain Cases
The Supreme Court has held that a state court generally has a
constitutional duty to enforce claims that federal law creates, and to
enforce federal defenses in adjudicating claims that a nonfederal
285
source of law creates.
This section argues that if a state court is to
fulfill this duty, it cannot avoid making federal law in certain cases. It
is often argued that courts can avoid making federal common law by
applying state law to an issue to which they otherwise would apply federal common law. Indeed, certain scholars have argued that the Rules
of Decision Act requires federal courts generally to apply state law
rather than federal common law to issues that the Constitution and
286
federal statutes do not resolve. The Rules of Decision Act, interest287
ingly, does not purport to regulate state courts.
In any event, we
should not assume that turning to state law to fill the gaps in a federal
regulatory scheme necessarily obviates the need to make federal
common law in all cases.
Consider Nugent, the Illinois case that in effect made federal
common law on the question of whether a particular federal claim
288
survived the death of the defendant. Suppose that the Nugent court
had turned to Illinois law to determine whether a federal civil RICO
claim survives the death of the defendant. It would have found the
Illinois Survival Act, which provides that certain actions survive the
289
death of a party, and Illinois Supreme Court cases interpreting the
285

See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 467 (1990) (“[S]tate courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to consider civil claims arising under RICO.”); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S.
131, 151 (1988) (“[T]he Supremacy Clause imposes on state courts a constitutional
duty ‘to proceed in such manner that all the substantial rights of the parties under
controlling federal law [are] protected.’” (alteratino in original) (quoting Garrett v.
Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245 (1942))); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394
(1947) (holding that so long as state courts “have jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate” a federal claim, they “are not free to refuse enforcement”).
286
See Merrill, supra note 7, at 30-31 (stressing that the Act disavows making federal common law where there is state law that can be applied); Redish, supra note 7, at
766-67 (describing how courts should implement the Act).
287
See Weinberg, supra note 7, at 862 (observing that the Act is “limited in application by its own language to federal courts only”).
288
Bank of N. Ill. v. Nugent, 584 N.E.2d 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
289
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-6 (West 1993).
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Act. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that “the Survival Act has
historically been limited to compensatory damages” and that, conversely, “punitive damages do not generally survive under the Survival
290
Act.” Assuming for the sake of simplicity that it made no difference
under Illinois law whether predicate conduct by other defendants occurred before or after the defendant’s death, applying Illinois law
would have required the Nugent court to decide whether an award of
treble damages under RICO is remedial or punitive. This is not a
judgment, however, that the Nugent court could have made without in
effect making federal law.
It is state law that allows or does not allow survival if a provision is
remedial or punitive, but it is federal law that is remedial or punitive,
and thus does or does not impose liability against an estate. In other
words, though Illinois law would supply the standard—remedial but
not punitive actions survive—the standard requires a court to identify
features of the federal statute that render it remedial or punitive.
Identifying such features will not in all cases qualify as a mere act of
“interpretation” under any recognized rule of interpretation. Congress may have enacted a statute that in letter and purpose defies
categorization under a state law scheme for which Congress had no
regard. If a federal statute is both remedial and punitive as Congress
has enacted it, but a court must choose one characterization or the
other, the process by which the court classifies the statute as remedial
or punitive under state law may result in the making of federal law just
as it may when a court must classify a statute as remedial or punitive
for purposes of federal common law.
To characterize RICO as, say, “remedial” rather than “punitive”
under Illinois law is to identify features of RICO that purportedly any
other state court should consider if relevant under its survival law. Indeed, if the law of another state provided the same standard as Illinois
law provides for determining whether actions survive the death of the
defendant, but the courts of that other state determined that RICO
was “punitive” rather than “remedial,” there would be a conflict between courts of different states on a federal question that the Su-

290

Kleinwort Benson N. Am., Inc. v. Quantum Fin. Servs., Inc., 692 N.E.2d 269,
272 (Ill. 1998). The same general law would have applied if the Epstein court had
turned to New York law. A New York statute governing survival provides that “[f]or any
injury, an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of
the decedent, but punitive damages shall not be awarded.” N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS § 11-3.2 (McKinney 2001).
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291

preme Court could review on certiorari.
In sum, resorting to state
law to “fill the gaps” does not necessarily obviate the need in a given
case for a court to make federal common law.
The point is simply this: state courts cannot decide certain cases
that they have a constitutional duty to decide without making deter292
minations that in effect make federal common law.
The Constitution cannot require both that state courts enforce federal law and that
state courts make no federal law in doing so. If state courts have a
constitutional duty to enforce federal law, they must be justified in
making federal common law where necessary to fulfill that duty. If
there is an objection to state courts making determinations of federal
law that are not traceable by any recognized rule of interpretation to
the Constitution or a federal statute, the objection must be to state
courts making those determinations in a certain way.
C. How State Courts Historically Have Made the “Law of the Land”
There are different ways in which courts can be said to make law.
A common premise of many theories of federal common law is that if
a court is justified in making federal common law, it is justified in willing into existence whatever law it believes would best serve its sense of

291

See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985) (holding that “[t]he characterization of § 1983 for statute of limitations purposes is derived from the elements of the
cause of action, and Congress’ purpose in providing it,” and that “[t]hese, of course,
are matters of federal law”); Int’l Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696,
706 (1966) (“[T]he characterization of this action for the purpose of selecting the appropriate state limitations provision is ultimately a question of federal law.”).
292
This is not to say that it is necessary for state courts to make federal law in any
case in which federal law provides the rule of decision. But it is necessary more often
than some scholars have acknowledged. Redish has argued, for example, that it is
necessary for courts to fill gaps only when “the issue being judicially resolved is one
that must be resolved before the statute may be applied—in other words, where not to
decide the issue is effectively to decide it.” Redish, supra note 7, at 795. Such issues
include those that “must be resolved before the statute can be applied to matters concededly within its realm,” and excludes “matters simply not reached by the statute’s
text.” Id. at 796. This overlooks that it may be necessary for a state court to make federal law even if it turns to state law to fill gaps. Moreover, this distinction is not readily
apparent in the case of the civil RICO claim against the deceased defendant’s estate. Is
the survivability of a RICO claim against the deceased defendant’s estate an issue that
must be resolved before the statute can be applied to matters concededly within its
realm, or a matter simply not reached by the statute’s text? If it is the latter, the court’s
determination that it must dismiss the case because the statute does not address the
survival question would be a judge-made determination that no current federal statute
compels.
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293

the national interest. It does not follow, however, from the fact that
a court is justified in rendering a decision that makes law that it is justified in making law on the basis of purely forward-looking policy determinations. As this section explains, the historical practice of state
courts has not been to decide matters that courts today consider to be
governed by federal common law as if those courts were making the
kind of policy judgment that might move a legislature to make law.
Rather, state courts have justified their decisions on the grounds that
they are most in line with the requirements of existing legal principles. On the one hand, this point might seem too obvious to be worth
making—of course, it might be said, courts generally act as if they are
applying rather than making law. On the other hand, in certain instances the Supreme Court has made federal common law for forward-looking policy reasons without any pretense that it was applying
294
Scholars addressing federal common law
existing legal principles.
have typically assumed that courts make federal common law (selfconsciously or otherwise) in a way that qualifies as legislative-type policymaking. The fact that state courts have not professed to engage in
federal policymaking is significant. Even if state courts in reality have
decided federal common law matters on the basis of forward-looking
policy considerations, in exceptional cases or as a general practice, the
fact that they have consistently professed to decide them on the basis
of existing legal principles suggests an understanding that the legitimacy of their decisions depends on their acting in accordance with existing law.
To understand how state courts historically have approached matters of federal common law, it is necessary first to recognize that “federal common law” was not a meaningful term in the late eighteenth,
the nineteenth, and the early twentieth centuries. During that time
period, “general principles” or “general law” governed several matters
295
that courts today describe as governed by federal common law.
General law, or the law of nations, governed matters that courts today
categorize as commercial law, admiralty and maritime law, conflict of
293

See supra text accompanying notes 14-17 (describing different ways scholars
have stated this assumption).
294
See infra notes 405-08 and accompanying text (describing example of the Supreme Court acting in this way).
295
See Stewart Jay, The Origins of Federal Common Law: Part II, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
1231, 1267-71 (1985) (describing “general law” as “an understood body of existing
principles, or at least a jurisprudence capable of being understood through the exercise of reason,” and explaining why, during the era in which general law was thought
to operate, “‘federal common law’ was not a meaningful term”).
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laws, and private international law. General law existed by virtue of
international custom and practice and was distinguishable from “local” law, which governed such matters as realty, probate, and proce296
dure. In some cases, courts applied the common law of England to
297
matters that today courts describe federal common law as governing.
There is no need here to repeat the extensive treatment that others
have given to the operation of general law versus local law in the
298
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Suffice it to say that general
principles were not uniquely federal law: general principles operated
as the rule of decision in state and foreign courts before there even
was a United States federal government. Though general law was not
federal law, it was regarded as “the law of the land” in cases in which it
applied. St. George Tucker explained in his edition of Blackstone’s
Commentaries that various sources of law would apply in courts of the
United States when “the written law is silent,” including not just local
299
In
law, but general law and the common law of England as well.
cases in which principles of general law or the common law of England applied, courts should regard them, he wrote, “as the law of the
300
As Stewart Jay has explained in recent times, “[u]nder the
land.”
296

See RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
COMMON LAW: THE DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND
FEDERALISM 51-53 (1977) (describing how these areas of law were considered to be
outgrowths of the law of nations).
297
See id. at 53-60 (discussing cases in which federal courts applied “general law”
or common law to issues now said to be governed by federal common law).
298
See id. at 51-60 (discussing categories of law commonly in use in this period);
Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a
Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 111-15 (1993) (identifying the
previously accepted distinction between “general” and “local” law); William A.
Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example
of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1527-28 (1984) (arguing that late eighteenth century federal courts followed local law in matters of local concern, but rarely
found local law dispositive on matters of national concern); Jay, supra note 295, at
1263-67 (examining that distinction in the context of Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789).
299
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *429-30.
300
Id. State cases in the first decades after ratification routinely referred to general principles as the “law of the land.” See French v. Gray, 2 Conn. 92, 111 (1816) (describing rules of statutory construction as the “law of the land”); Evans v. Hesler, 4 Ky.
561, 561 (1809) (distinguishing local custom from “the general laws of the land”);
Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438, 415 (N.Y. 1819) (referring to “general law of
the land”); Yates v. People, 6 Johns. 337, 466 (N.Y. 1810) (explaining that decisions of
the court on “general principles” were the “law of the land”) (opinion of Clinton, J.),
overruled by Mitchell’s Case, 12 Abb. Pr. 249 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861); Sleght v. Hartshorne,
2 Johns. 531 (N.Y. 1807) (explaining that the term “usages of trade” can refer either to
“general usages of trade, which compose the law of merchants, of universal authority
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formulations of the Framers, the interests of the federal government
were not thought to require the creation of a distinctive federal law” by
the courts; “[m]atters of general law possessed by definition a transnational character, while local law was identifiable with the range of
concerns that the Framers indicated would remain ‘internal’ to the
301
states.”
In time, general principles dissipated as a source of law in state
and federal courts. In the late nineteenth and the early twentieth
centuries, the distinction between general law and local law became
302
increasingly blurred, the operation of general principles varied
303
more and more from court to court, and the rise of positivistic legal
thought led courts to conclude that all law, including general law,
304
must be attributable to a sovereign source.
Today, federal common law does not occupy the entire field of
matters that general law was thought to occupy in its day. For example, in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, courts described general principles as governing extensive aspects of commercial transactions. Courts today do not describe federal common law as
generally governing such matters. Conversely, courts today describe
federal common law as governing areas that general law was not understood to govern. For example, courts today describe federal common law as governing when there is a significant conflict between the
operation of state law and a uniquely federal interest. Courts in the
among commercial men in civilized societies, and forming one of the constituent parts
of the laws of this State, as the general law of the land” or to local usages (emphasis
omitted)); Thomas v. O’Hara, 8 S.C.L. 303, 303 (S.C. 1817) (distinguishing “general
law of the land” from “usages of local origin”).
301
Jay, supra note 295, at 1274-75.
302
See id. at 1267 (explaining that the muddling of “the demarcation between
general and local law” contributed to the collapse of general law as a source of law); see
also BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 296, at 119-22 (explaining how in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, federal courts began to expand the field in
which general law previously was understood to operate—for example, the area of
torts).
303
See Jay, supra note 295, at 1267 (explaining that the lack of uniformity in general law that resulted from courts making different determinations of it contributed to
the collapse of general law as a source of law).
304
See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 296, at 123-27 (arguing that the rise of a
“positivistic judicial philosophy” contributed to the unsettling of general principles as a
source of law). The penultimate statement of this shift is, of course, the following from
Oliver Wendell Holmes, which the Court quoted in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 79 (1938): “‘[L]aw in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist
without some definite authority behind it.’ ” (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes,
J., dissenting)).
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late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries did not describe general
principles as generally governing such matters. That said, there are
significant areas of overlap between the fields that courts historically
described general law as occupying and those that courts today describe federal common law as occupying. These include disputes involving the rights and obligations of the United States in commercial
transactions, admiralty and maritime disputes, certain interstate disputes, and certain disputes implicating principles of international
305
law.
Regardless of the source of law operative in state courts—be it
general principles or federal common law—the standard practice of
state courts in the making of that law has been consistent in one crucial respect: they have not claimed to make that law on the basis of
what would be the best policy nationally (federal common law) or
transnationally (general principles); rather, they have claimed to decide cases in accordance with the requirements of the existing law of
the land. The case study presented earlier of how state and federal
courts have answered the question whether particular federal claims
survive the death of the defendant is illustrative.
As explained, the 1804 New York decision in Franklin and the 1991
306
Illinois decision in Nugent made law on this question in a real sense.
Neither of these courts, however, claimed to make it on the basis of
what it thought would implement good policy as a purely forwardlooking matter. The Franklin court claimed to decide the issue on the
basis of a “general and universal proposition” that the court was
307
“bound to pronounce.” The court made a judgment in the course
of deciding the case: where the testator’s misfeasance causes an injury
to the plaintiff but no gain to the testator, assumpsit will not lie unless
308
It characterthe defendant’s assets benefit from the misfeasance.
ized the decision as being in line with the precedent that the court
309
considered. The dissent’s judgment that assumpsit could lie against
the testator if there was a contract from which he might have gained
310
also claimed to be consistent with prior cases.

305

See Tex. Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (identifying
these as traditional enclaves of federal common law).
306
See supra text accompanying notes 241-84 (explaining how these and other
courts made law).
307
Franklin v. Low, 1 Johns. 396, 402-03 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806).
308
Id. at 402.
309
Id. at 402-03.
310
Id. at 404-05 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
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The Nugent Court too did not claim to decide the survival issue
based on what would constitute the best national policy going forward. Rather, recognizing a split of federal authority on the question,
the court reasoned from what it characterized as an existing principle:
where predicate conduct occurs after the death of the defendant, the
311
The opinion professed to accord
RICO claim survives that death.
with all prior cases addressing this issue, regardless of whether they
found RICO to be remedial or punitive.
The characterization of courts historically purporting to “find” law
312
as a “brooding omnipresence in the sky” versus “making” law “with
313
the self-conscious goal of bringing about social change” is familiar.
It is unhelpful, however, in categorizing state court cases in which the
314
“law of the land” has been a rule of decision. Neither category captures the lawfinding or lawmaking process at work in Franklin and Nugent. Courts can discern requirements of existing law without those
requirements being a “brooding omnipresence in the sky” and can
make law without doing so “with the self-conscious goal of bringing
about social change.” Franklin and Nugent appear to have made law as
a necessary consequence of an effort to best discern and apply existing
legal principles. In this respect, they are typical of a method of state
court decision making regarding matters of general principles and
federal common law that generally has obtained since the time of the
Founding.
First, consider cases that state courts described general law as governing in the first half of the nineteenth century that, if brought to-

311

See Bank of N. Ill. v. Nugent, 584 N.E.2d 948, 958 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (dismissing arguments that a civil RICO action does not survive the death of the alleged
wrongdoer).
312
See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice
of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified . . . .”).
313
Morton Horwitz has argued that judges in the early nineteenth century “came
to think of the common law as equally responsible with legislation for governing society and promoting socially desirable conduct. The emphasis on law as an instrument
of policy encouraged innovation and allowed judges to formulate legal doctrine with
the self-conscious goal of bringing about social change.” MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 30 (1977).
314
Randall Bridwell and Ralph Whitten have explained in a helpful way the limitations of this dichotomy. See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 296, at 51-53 (arguing
that federal courts in the early eighteenth century did not try to decide general law
cases according to transcendental legal principles or strategic policy design, but rather
according to established custom).
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day, courts would describe federal common law as governing. One
category of such cases is those implicating certain proprietary rights
316
317
In Commonwealth v. Gamble,
and obligations of the United States.
for instance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had to resolve whether
the enlistment of a minor in the Marines was a valid contract. The
court held that it was, on the following grounds:
[The common law of England holds that a minor is] at liberty to enter
into a contract to serve the state, wherever such contract is not positively
forbidden by the state itself; [moreover] there is nothing in the constitution of the government, or of the circumstances of the people of this
country, to afford a reason why it should not be the common law here.
In a state of war, the necessity of such a principle is obvious; and the
318
same necessity exists, although in a less degree, in a state of peace.

The court’s decision purported to be consistent with existing legal
principles (“the common law of England”) and their rationale (“the
319
necessity of such a principle is obvious”).
315

These cases emerged from a review of all state court cases contained in Westlaw
databases that were decided between 1791 and 1840 and that include the words
“United States,” the words “Cong.” or “Congress” within two words of “Act,” or the
word “federal” within two words of “act” or “statute.” The intent was to capture as
many cases as possible in which the interests of the United States would be involved or
issues would arise in the enforcement of a federal statute that the statute did not itself
resolve. The process of gathering cases did not employ, strictly speaking, scientific
procedures to ensure a random sample. That said, if a significant number of cases exist that defy the description set forth in this section, it seems that at least a few would
have emerged in the hundreds of cases reviewed.
316
The Supreme Court has held in recent times that federal common law governs
certain proprietary interests of the United States. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs.
Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (explaining that “obligations to and rights of the
United States under its contracts are governed exclusively by federal law”); Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (holding that “[t]he rights and
duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than local law”). State courts resolved such matters in the first half of the
nineteenth century on the basis of general law, where it applied, and in a way that professed to accord with existing general law principles.
317
11 Serg. & Rawle 93 (Pa. 1824).
318
Id. at 94.
319
Id.; see also Martin’s Adm’r v. United States, 18 Ky. (2 T.B. Mon.) 89, 90 (Ky.
1825) (holding that in an action by the United States to collect on a distiller’s bond,
the distiller’s act of giving 400 gallons of whiskey to the revenue collector was not an
accord and satisfaction of the distiller’s obligation to the United States on grounds that
an accord and satisfaction depends “entirely upon the authority of the collector to receive whisky in payment of the obligation,” which under general agency principles the
agent did not have), readjudicated with same result by 20 Ky. (4 T.B. Mon.) 487 (Ky.
1827); State v. Dimick, 12 N.H. 194, 199 (1841) (holding that a minor who entered
into a contract of enlistment with the United States Army without the consent of his
parent, which a federal statute required for a minor to enlist, could ratify the contract
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This method of decision making is also evident in cases involving
320
For example, in Maxwell v.
the civil liability of federal officials.
321
M’Ilvoy, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky (the highest Kentucky
state court at the time) had to resolve whether a deputy federal postmaster was liable to a party wronged by his negligence in office. The
court resolved that
[u]pon general principles . . . he ought to be liable, if the charge against
him be true in fact; for there is no maxim of law less unexceptionable,
upon the solid basis of right and sound policy, than that he who, for gain
or a premium, undertakes to perform an act or discharge a duty, and
from negligence or culpable omission suffers the interest and property
322
of his employer to be destroyed or lost, is liable for the injury.

Again, the court claimed that its decision was consistent with existing
law (“general principles”) and its rationale (“upon the solid basis of
323
right and sound policy”).

upon reaching the age of majority so as to render it binding on the ground “that the
contract of enlistment was one which the infant might ratify, on his coming of age, so
as to bind himself; and that this might be done by his acts, in the same manner that he
might ratify other contracts”); Blake v. Johnson, 1 N.H. 91, 92 (1817) (holding that a
collector of duties upon carriages who conducts a distress and sale under a federal
statute must keep the goods for a reasonable time before selling them on grounds that
“[t]he common law in no case authorized the immediate sale of a distress[, nor is such
sale] warranted by statute, either in England or in this country”); United States v.
Vaughn, 3 Binn. 394, 399-400 (Pa. 1811) (holding that the United States may not attach bank stock as the property of individuals, in whose name the stock was held in the
books of the bank but who in fact had sold the stock to others, on grounds that “a
mere chose in action equitably assigned, is not subject to the operation of a foreign
attachment instituted against the party, whose name must necessarily be used at law for
the recovery of the demand; and that an attaching creditor can stand on no better
footing than his debtor,” a principle which “appears from the English authorities, and
the adjudications in our sister states’ courts”).
320
The Supreme Court has held in several contexts in recent times that federal
common law governs “the civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in the
course of their duty.” Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 505 (1988).
321
5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 211 (1810).
322
Id. at 213-14.
323
Id. at 213. Another example is Schroyer v. Lynch, 8 Watts 453 (Pa. 1839), in
which the court decided the issue of whether a deputy postmaster was liable for delinquencies of an assistant that the assistant had concealed from the deputy with reference to the principle that
every deputy postmaster ought to devote a proper portion of his time, either
to the performance of the duties of his office himself in person, or to the superintendence of his assistants while employed in performing the same . . .
that he may be made liable for losses occasioned through the want of such
personal attention on his part, seems to be equally reasonable and just. . . .
The answer of the court below, in every other respect . . . appears to be in accordance with the authority of Dunlap v. Monroe [a United States Supreme
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This method of decision making is also evident in cases resolving
324
325
certain issues of international law. In Amory v. M’Gregor, for example, the New York Supreme Court had to decide whether an American
citizen, upon the outbreak of war, had the right to withdraw his goods
from the enemy country. In resolving this issue, the court explained:
That all trading with an enemy is illegal, is a general and well settled
rule. The principle is recognised and sanctioned, as well by the common
law, as by the maritime codes of all the European nations. It is a wise
and salutary rule; but it would require the most direct and controling
authority, to satisfy my mind, that the mere act of withdrawing goods
from the enemy’s country, at the breaking out of a war, comes within the
reason or policy of the rule; and no case has fallen under my observa326
tion, that has pressed the principle thus far.

In other words, the court explained, “[i]ntercourse, inconsistent with
actual hostility, is the offence against which the operation of the rule
327
is directed,” not removing one’s own property from an enemy country. To the extent that this case developed, rather than merely applied, general law principles, it did so through a process of ascertaining the requirements of existing law (“no case . . . has pressed the
principle thus far”) and its rationale (“intercourse, inconsistent with
328
actual hostility” is the existing rule’s concern).

Court case] and therefore free from error.
Id. at 457-58.
324
Recently scholars have debated vigorously the idea that certain principles of
international law operate in the jurisdiction of the United States as federal common
law. Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 816, 873-76 (1997)
(questioning the validity of customary international law operating as federal common
law), with Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1824, 1841 (1998) (supporting the rule that international law is federal law). There is
no need here to take a position in this debate. Suffice it to say that when matters implicating international law arose in cases within the proper jurisdiction of state courts
in the first half of the nineteenth century, state courts resolved such matters based on
general principles of the law of nations and in a way that purported to respect those
principles.
325
15 Johns. 24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818).
326
Id. at 34-35 (emphases and citation omitted).
327
Id. at 35 (emphasis omitted).
328
People v. McLeod, 25 Wend. 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841), provides another example.
The court had to decide whether New York courts could prosecute a British subject
who committed a homicide in New York. The defendant asserted that he committed
the homicide at the direction of Great Britain, a defense of possible merit if the United
States and Britain were at war. An issue in the case, then, was whether the two countries in fact were at war. In addressing this issue, the court cited writers on the law of
nations, Blackstone, and English cases to discern the governing law. The court be-
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Even during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—
when, it has been argued, the “legitimation of a positivistic judicial philosophy . . . produced a decline in the studious examination and use
of precedent in accordance with its historically founded limita329
tions” —it is not the case that state courts claimed to decide cases according to what they thought general principles should be. As the
positivistic thinking that culminated in Erie came to prevail, courts began a process of attributing matters of general law to either state or
330
331
For example, in Southern Railway Co. v. Prescott, the
federal law.
Supreme Court determined that the Interstate Commerce Act “manifest[ed] the intent of Congress that the obligation of the carrier with
respect to the services within the purview of the statute shall be governed by uniform rule in the place of the diverse requirements of
332
state legislation and decisions.” As Congress had set forth no such
uniform rule, general principles had to govern. To generate uniform-

lieved that “on the question of war or peace there is a quo animo of nations, by which
we are bound.” Id. at 579.
In Wall v. Robson, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 497 (S.C. Ct. Const. App. 1820), the
court held that a war suspends the operation of the statute of limitations between the
citizens of the two countries during the time the war continues on this reasoning:
From the foregoing principles, laid down by Lord Coke, it appears, that the
common law recognizes the civil law, and they both coincide and harmonize
upon this important subject, namely, that in time of war no action can be
maintained by an alien enemy; but upon the return of peace, all the friendly
relations between the subjects and citizens of the two countries are restored,
and their rights may be mutually prosecuted in the courts of justice in either
country, respectively, without hindrance or interruption.
Id. at 502; see also Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438, 444-45, 448 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1819) (holding that the court should “sustain a suit in favour of a citizen on his contract made with an enemy, and arising out of his commerce with the enemy in time of
war” only after analyzing “the authorities, in order to discover what are the correct
opinions and decisions of the enlightened part of mankind”); Clarke v. Morey, 10
Johns. 69, 73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (holding that an alien living in the United States
during time of war between the United States and her country is entitled to sue and be
sued as in time of peace, for, among other reasons, “it has now become the sense and
practice of nations, and may be regarded as the public law of Europe” (emphasis omitted)); Commonwealth v. Holloway, 1 Serg. & Rawle 392, 396 (Pa. 1815) (holding that
an alderman may not imprison the seaman of a foreign vessel, shipping in England,
who has deserted in an American port, until he finds security to go on his voyage on
the following grounds: from the “the usage and practice of nations,” the court could
not “say that, from any evidence which has been adduced to us, there prevails such an
uniform and general practice, as is entitled to the name of the law of nations”).
329
BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 296, at 123.
330
That process continues today, as shown by recent debates over whether customary international law is state law or federal common law. Supra note 324.
331
240 U.S. 632 (1916).
332
Id. at 639-40.
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ity, the Court characterized the operation of general principles in this
area as a federal matter: “[T]he measure of liability under [the Act]
must . . . be regarded as a federal question. . . . And the question . . . is
none the less a Federal one because it must be resolved by the applica333
tion of general principles of the common law.”
Where the Supreme Court “federalized” general principles of law,
state courts as a standard practice claimed to follow Supreme Court
334
determinations of those principles.
In other matters, general law
remained distinct from federal law. It is interesting to observe how
state courts treated Supreme Court precedent on general law regarding such matters. In countless cases, state courts simply explained
how their determinations of federal law were “affirmed by” or “sup335
ported under” Supreme Court decisions. In other cases (fewer and
333

Id.
See, e.g., Mut. Orange Distribs. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. 217 Ill.
App. 23, 29-31 (1920) (citing Prescott and applying its principle); Conover v. Wabash
Ry. Co., 208 Ill. App. 105, 111-12 (1917) (same); see also Klinge v. S. Pac. Co., 57 P.2d
367, 370 (Utah 1936) (“The question of the proper measure of damages is inseparably
connected with the right of action, and, in cases arising under the Federal [Employers’
Liability] Act . . . it must be settled according to general principles of law as administered in the Federal Court.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Miller v.
Miller, 257 Ill. App. 287, 298 (1930) (applying same principle); Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co. v. McWhorter, 275 S.W. 363, 364 (Ky. 1925) (same); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Briggs, 215 S.W. 529, 531 (Ky. 1919) (same); Crecelius v.
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 223 S.W. 413, 416 (Mo. 1920) (same); Sheean
v. Hines, 184 N.W. 934, 938 (Neb. 1921) (same). State courts applied this reasoning in
actions under other federal statutes as well. For example, in St. Louis-San Francisco
Railway Co. v. Barron, 267 S.W. 582 (Ark. 1924), the court held that in an action under
the Federal Safety Appliance Act, certain questions relating to liability must be resolved
according to United States Supreme Court precedent, for “the test of all substantive
questions relating to liability must depend upon the Federal statute and the interpretation thereof by the Supreme Court”; only upon finding no precedent did the court
decide it was “at liberty to look to the general principles of the law as announced by
our own court.” Id. at 584-85.
These state court cases, as well as the remainder of state court cases cited in this
section, emerged from a review of all state cases contained in Westlaw databases that
were decided between 1842 (the year that the Court decided Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1 (1842)) and 1938 (the year that the Court decided Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938)), and that include the phrases “Supreme Court,” “United States,”
and “general principles.”
335
See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. First Nat’l Bank, 140 So. 755, 759 (Ala. 1932)
(“The conclusion [of an Alabama case decided according to general principles of law]
is supported under the rule of subrogation by the decision cited from the Supreme
Court of the United States . . . .”); Am. Radio Stores, Inc. v. Am. Radio & Television
Stores Corp., 150 A. 180, 183 (Del. Ch. 1930) (“[U]nder the general principles of law
governing in unfair competition cases . . . . trade-mark rights rest in user. As was said
by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .”); Paducah Distilleries Co. v. Crescent
Mfg. Co., 6 Teiss. 151, 155 (La. Ct. App. 1909) (“The general principles applicable to
334
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more far between), state courts voluntarily overturned their own
precedents on matters of general law in light of Supreme Court
336
precedent on such matters, or deemed themselves compelled to fol337
low such Supreme Court precedents.
Under either approach, the
trade-marks and the conditions under which a party may establish an exclusive right to
the use of a name or symbol, are well settled by . . . decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States . . . .”); Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 87 A. 927, 931 (Md.
1913) (“[T]here ought not be any difficulty about the general principles of law in this
State applicable to this class of actions. . . . The doctrine . . . . has been affirmed by the
Supreme Court of the United States . . . and is followed by many of the state courts.”);
Hastings v. Mont. Union Ry. Co., 46 P. 264, 265 (Mont. 1896) (“The general principles
of the law of master and servant . . . are controlling in this instance. We note . . . that
the [S]upreme [C]ourt of the United States . . . has reiterated the doctrine . . . .”);
Robinson v. Centenary Fund & Preachers’ Aid, 54 A. 416, 417 (N.J. 1903) (“These are
the general principles laid down in the text-books and recognized in the Judicial Reports of this state. . . . To the same effect is the recent decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States . . . .”); Mitchell v. Carolina Cent. R.R. Co., 32 S.E. 671, 673 (N.C.
1899) (“The law does not consist of particular cases, but of general principles, which
are illustrated and explained by these cases. . . . [A] few citations from the Supreme
Court of the United States, which sustain the rule most favorable to the carrier, will
sufficiently illustrate this view . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Carlisle v.
Wishart, 11 Ohio 172, 191-92 (1842) (en banc) (“It is believed that the law, as thus settled by the highest tribunal in the country, will become the uniform rule of all, as it
now is of most of the states.”); Whale v. Rice, 49 P.2d 737, 741 (Okla. 1935) (“The principle invoked is well recognized in law. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United
States . . . .”); Mason v. Apalache Mills, 62 S.E. 399, 401 (S.C. 1908) (“These general
principles are also stated and form the basis of . . . [an] opinion of the Supreme Court
of the United States . . . .”); Tait’s Ex’r v. Cent. Lunatic Asylum, 4 S.E. 697, 701 (Va.
1888) (“These general principles are of the utmost importance in the administration
of justice. . . . And in a recent case in the [S]upreme [C]ourt of the United States the
rule, and the reason upon which it is founded, is stated . . . .”) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Walker v. Beauchler, 68 Va. (27 Gratt) 511, 519 (1876) (“[T]he
[S]upreme [C]ourt of the United States has . . . decided that the late conflict was a
war . . . and that . . . to determine how the contracts, rights and obligations of citizens
were affected by that war, recourse must be had to the general principles applicable to
a state of war between nations.”).
In Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 527 (1928), the Supreme Court observed that “state courts quite generally construe the common law as this Court has applied it.”
336
See, e.g., Metro. Nat’l Bank of N.Y. City v. Gordon, 28 Ark. 115, 118 (1872)
(“And when the highest court of the nation has repeatedly considered and fully settled
the law upon questions alike cognizable before them and us, we are disposed to conform to their ruling, even to the overruling of the decisions of our own court.”).
337
See, e.g., Straughan v. Fairchild, 80 Ind. 598, 600-01 (1881) (“On a subject of
such general importance, and concerning which there can not properly be a local
rule . . . and since the highest tribunals in this country and in England are ruling in
harmony upon the point, a State court can hardly be justified in adopting . . . a different rule.”); Martin v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 53 So. 572, 574-75 (La. 1910) (“The
principle . . . is supported by the great weight of authority, and on questions of commercial law the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States should be fol-
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decision-making process in state courts professed to be one of deciding in accordance with the requirements of existing precedent.
In other cases, state courts rejected Supreme Court determinations of general principles for one of two (or both) reasons. One reason was that the Supreme Court determination, in the state court’s
view, did not accord with general principles, with which the state court
338
The other was that the Supreme
believed its decision must accord.
Court’s decision conflicted with the decision of a higher state court
339
that the state court deemed itself bound to follow.
In neither case were
state courts purporting to decide issues on the basis of what they
thought national or international policy should be.
In sum, state courts as a general practice historically have decided
matters of general law and federal common law in ways that claim to
340
hew to existing precedent.
While this observation may seem obvi-

lowed both for their authoritative weight, and for the sake of uniformity so desirable in
the matter of negotiable instruments.”).
338
An example is Midland National Bank v. Security Elevator Co., 200 N.W. 851
(Minn. 1924). There the court stated:
It is with painful reluctance that, on this question of general import, we
cannot adopt the rule of the Supreme Court of the United States. . . . [W]hile
the uniformity of decision so desirable upon questions of general law can best
be achieved in this country by following the lead of the Supreme Court, yet
each state court is at liberty to disregard its leadership, for the time being,
when satisfied that a rule has been adopted, as a rule of the common law, as to
which there is, not a conflict among those authorities recognized as evidence
of that law, but an absence of authority.
200 N.W. at 855 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wilcox v. Draper, 10 N.W.
579, 585 (Neb. 1881) (“A desire to conform our rulings . . . to those of the supreme
court of the United States, and thus secure uniformity of decisions, inclines us to follow . . . [the decisions of] that court. But it is of much greater importance that decisions shall be based upon sound principles and correct law.”); Bindley v. Martin Bros.,
28 W. Va. 773, 792 (1886) (“The progress of the legal opinion of this country is towards the position of the modern English courts, and the disposition, to depart from
the law as laid down by the Supreme Court on account of the difficulty of applying it
because of the many exceptions . . . .”).
339
See, e.g., Ga. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Stanley, 145 S.E. 530, 532 (Ga. Ct. App.
1928) (“‘In respect to questions of general law, the State courts are required to follow
the decisions of the highest court of the State, and are not bound by the authority of
the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .’ ” (quoting Rothschild & Co. v. Steger &
Sons Piano Mfg. Co., 99 N.E. 920, 924 (1912))).
340
This is not in any way to deny that at various times states have resisted the operation of certain federal laws. The famous Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1798
and 1799 claimed certain powers in states to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional.
Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 10, 1798 & Nov. 14, 1799), reprinted in 5
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 131-35 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987);
James Madison, Virginia Resolutions (Dec. 21, 1798), reprinted in 5 FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra, at 135-36. (Even these resolutions were not, however, attempts
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ous, it is nonetheless significant. Historically, state courts have
claimed to decide matters of federal common law in a different manner, first, than the Supreme Court has decided certain matters of federal common law (as Part IV of this Article explains) and, second,
than scholars usually presume that federal courts decide matters of
federal common law.
Of course, it may be argued, as it often is, that the fact that courts
purport to act for one reason (in accordance with the requirements of
existing law) does not mean that they are not in reality acting for another (in accordance with policy preferences of the particular judge).
Assuming this to be true—either in exceptional cases or as a general
practice—the fact that state courts have overwhelmingly claimed to
abide by the existing law of the land demonstrates a judicial understanding that abiding by such existing law is necessary for their decisions to be justified.
D. Reconciling Federal Lawmaking by State
Courts with the Supremacy Clause
The manner in which state courts historically have claimed to enforce the law of the land, including federal common law, comports
more easily with the Supremacy Clause than a manner in which they
would act as an adjunct federal legislature. The language of the Supremacy Clause is familiar:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not341
withstanding.

As argued in Part II.A, the Supremacy Clause itself does not justify
state courts in “legislating” the federal law to which they are bound.
This section will take the argument a step further: the Supremacy

to make federal law. Rather, as Wayne Moore has observed, the authors of the resolutions “presumed that the Constitution’s meaning was independent not only of their
positions but also of interpretations by one or more federal officials.” Wayne D.
Moore, Reconceiving Interpretive Autonomy: Insights from the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 342-43 (1994).) It is only to say that when state courts
have applied general law or federal common law as a rule of decision, they have not
claimed to make it.
341
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Clause affirmatively forbids state courts from engaging in conscious
federal policy change.
The Supremacy Clause has an uneasy relationship with the concept of federal common law. On the one hand, there is strong evidence that, as an original matter, the Supremacy Clause contemplated
only the Constitution, laws enacted by Congress, and federal treaties
342
as the federal supreme law of the land. Accordingly, it has been argued, the Supremacy Clause excludes federal common law as an addi343
tional kind of federal supreme law of the land. On the other hand,
courts historically described general principles as operating as the
“law of the land” absent a proper exercise of legislative displace344
As the Supreme Court recast certain general principles as
ment.
federal common law, it described such law as principles of federal law
345
binding on state courts. Several scholars, as already explained, have
described federal common law as binding on state courts under the
346
Supremacy Clause.
No matter which view is correct, a constitutional principle that a
state court may make federal law on the basis of its views of what national policy should be is unsustainable under the Supremacy Clause.
The core purpose of the Supremacy Clause was to prevent the states
from interfering with the unified operation of federal law. John Jay
argued in 1787, shortly before the Constitutional Convention, that the
Continental Congress should forbid state legislatures from enacting
their own interpretations of national treaties. He made two points
that foreshadowed debates in the Federal Convention and ratification
conventions regarding the supremacy of federal law. First, he argued
that it is nonsensical for federal law to mean one thing in one state
and another thing in another state. In his words, it is “irrational” that
“the same Article of the same treaty might by law be made to mean
one thing in New Hampshire, another thing in New York, and neither
347
the one nor the other of them in Georgia.” Second, he argued that
courts would determine the content of treaties according to the same
legal principles. In his words, all courts had the same “duty” to de342

See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1334-36 (2001) (explaining textual evidence that “Laws” in Supremacy
Clause means congressionally enacted statutes).
343
Id. at 1452-59.
344
See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
345
See supra note 300-333 and accompanying text.
346
Supra note 12 and accompanying text.
347
John Jay, Continental Congress (Apr. 13, 1787), reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, surpa note 340, at 589, 590.
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termine the meaning of treaties “according to the rules and maxims
348
established by the laws of Nations for the interpretation of treaties.”
The need to prevent states from controlling the operation of federal law, and the duty of judges to observe one and the same federal
law, were central themes in Federal Convention and ratification debates over the supremacy of federal law. First, there is little dispute
that the core purpose of the Supremacy Clause was to ensure that the
states did not control the operation of federal law. The history is familiar. At the Federal Convention, James Madison and others initially
favored a federal congressional power to negative legislative acts of
the states. They argued that the power to negative would control the
“constant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal author349
ity.” Indeed, Madison described “[t]he mutability of the laws of the
350
He believed that “the evils issuing from
States” as “a serious evil.”
these sources contributed more to that uneasiness which produced
the Convention, and prepared the public mind for general reform,
than those which accrued to our national character and interest from
351
the inadequacy of the Confederation to its immediate objects.” Ultimately, the Convention agreed not upon a negative, but upon a declaration that state judges shall be bound by federal law. Though some
352
argued that such a provision would not be as effective as a negative,

348

Id.
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 164 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS]. The records of the Convention reflect
Madison’s view as follows: “Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the States
to encroach on the federal authority; to violate national Treaties, to infringe the rights
& interests of each other; to oppress the weaker party within their respective jurisdictions.” Id. He thought that “[t]his prerogative of the General Govt. is the great pervading principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of the States; which,
without it, will continually fly out of their proper orbits and destroy the order & harmony of the political system.” Id. at 165. James McClurg wrote to Madison in August
1787 that “I have still some hope that I shall hear from you of ye reinstatement of ye
Negative—as it is certainly ye only mean by which the several Legislatures can be restrain’d from disturbing ye order & harmony of ye whole, & ye Governmt. render’d
properly national, & one.” Letter from James McClurg to James Madison (Aug. 22,
1787), reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 340, at 597, 597 (emphasis
omitted).
350
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in 1
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 340, at 644, 646.
351
Id.
352
In arguing in favor of a negative, Madison expressed that “[c]onfidence can
[not] be put in the State Tribunals as guardians of the National authority and interests.
In all the States these are more or less dependt. on the Legislatures.” 2 RECORDS, supra
note 349, at 27-28 (brackets in original). Similarly, James Wilson expressed the view
that “[t]he firmness of Judges is not of itself sufficient[.] Something further is requi349
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its intended purpose was the same: to prevent a “part” from control353
William McClaine argued in the North Carolina
ling the “whole.”
ratifying convention that “[t]o permit the local laws of any state to
control the laws of the Union, would be to give the general government no powers at all. If the judges are not to be bound by it, the
354
powers of Congress will be nugatory.”
Second, though some believed that judges would not be as effective in ensuring the enforcement of federal law as a congressional
negative, it appears to have been generally understood that the role of
judges would not be to act as adjunct federal legislators in adjudicating federal cases. Gordon Wood has described how colonists in the
late eighteenth century both feared judicial discretion and were con355
cerned for equity in their laws.
There was a tension between the
356
“profound fear of judicial independence and discretion” and the inability of legislatures to always be “able to guarantee equity by their
357
enactments.”
Ultimately, he suggests, “most Americans” were “too
apprehensive of the possible arbitrariness and uncertainties of judicial
358
discretion” to have judges exercising a legislative-type will.
Statements by prominent members of the Founding generation accord
with this understanding.
Under the Articles of Confederation, John Jay assumed that it
would be improper for state judges to act as state legislators had in
making law that thwarted the objects of federal treaties:

site—It will be better to prevent the passage of an improper law, than to declare it void
when passed.” Id. at 391.
353
4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 181 (Jonathan Elliot ed., New York, Burt Franklin, 2d ed.
1888).
354
Id. Governor Samuel Johnston similarly argued in the North Carolina ratifying
convention that “[t]he laws made in pursuance thereof by Congress ought to be the
supreme law of the land; otherwise, any one state might repeal the laws of the Union at
large. Without this clause, the whole Constitution would be a piece of blank paper.”
Id. at 187-88. Late in his life, James Madison wrote that it was to protect the “authority
of the whole” from “the parts separately and independently” that “dictated the clause
declaring that the Constitution & laws of the U.S. should be the supreme law of the
Land, anything in the constn or laws of any of the States to the contrary notwithstanding.” James Madison, Notes on Nullification (1835-36), reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 340, at 632, 632.
355
GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at
296-305 (1969).
356
Id. at 298.
357
Id. at 304.
358
Id.
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[W]hen it is considered that the Judges in general are Men of Character
and Learning, and feel as well as know the obligations of Office and the
value of reputation, there is no reason to doubt that their conduct and
Judgments relative to these as well as other Judicial matters will be wise
359
and upright.

Alexander Hamilton famously wrote in Federalist No. 78 that the role of
judges is different than the role of legislatures: “The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise
WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the sub360
stitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.” Chief Justice John Marshall sounded a similar theme while riding circuit in
1807 when he expressed that even a motion to the “discretion” of a
court “is a motion, not to its inclination, but to its judgment; and its
361
judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles.”
William
Cranch, in the preface to his reports of Supreme Court opinions, justified his enterprise as assisting judges to properly fulfill their responsibility to abide by existing law:
In a government which is emphatically stiled a government of laws, the
least possible range ought to be left for the discretion of the judge.
Whatever tends to render the laws certain, equally tends to limit that discretion; and perhaps nothing conduces more to that object than the
publication of reports. Every case decided is a check upon the judge.
He can not decide a similar case differently, without strong reasons,
which, for his own justification, he will wish to make public. The avenues to corruption are thus obstructed, and the sources of litigation
362
closed.

Thomas Jefferson wrote, “[r]elieve the judges from the rigour of text
law, and permit them, with pretorian discretion, to wander into it’s
363
equity, and the whole legal system becomes incertain.”
Jefferson
continued to criticize judicial discretion—“the honied Mansfieldism

359

John Jay, Continental Congress (Apr. 13, 1787), reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 340, at 589, 591.
360
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Elsewhere in Federalist No. 78, Hamilton wrote that “[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules
and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case
that comes before them.” Id. at 470.
361
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
362
William Cranch, Preface to 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) iii, iii-iv (William Cranch ed.,
1804).
363
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Phillip Mazzei (Nov. 28, 1785), reprinted in 9
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 67, 71 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1954).
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364

of Blackstone”—decades after the Founding. All of this merely confirms what is implicit in the text of the Supremacy Clause: the states
do not control the operation of federal law, and federal law is binding
on state judges in the performance of their uniquely judicial role.
Recognizing a power in state judges to make federal common law
based on what they believe national policy should be would turn the
Supremacy Clause on its head.
It might be asked in light of this analysis whether Congress, consistent with the Supremacy Clause, may delegate power to state courts to
make legislative-type federal common law. If Congress were to make
such a delegation, would not state courts, making federal law pursuant
to the delegation, merely be enforcing an existing principle of federal
law, namely that state courts should set federal policy? As argued in
Part II.B.2, we should not rush to infer such a delegation from a federal statute that does not expressly make it. There would be serious
questions regarding the constitutionality of such a delegation in light
of nondelegation and anticommandeering principles, and it does not
appear that Congress has ever made such an express delegation.
Suppose, however, that Congress did delegate power to state courts to
make federal law. Leaving nondelegation and anticommandeering
considerations to one side, there is a strong argument to be made that
such a delegation would not comport with the Supremacy Clause.
The Supremacy Clause characterizes federal law as the “supreme
365
Hamilton rhetorically asked in Federalist No. 33:
Law of the Land.”
“What inference can be drawn from this, or what would they amount
366
to, if they were not to be supreme?” He responded that “[i]t is evident they would amount to nothing. A LAW, by the very meaning of
367
the term, includes supremacy.” If federal law is the supreme law of
the land, it is the governing law throughout the jurisdiction of the
United States. This does not mean that federal law may not govern
activities in only one state. A federal law provides, for example, that a
portion of a canal “located in the City of Buffalo, State of New York, is
368
declared to be a nonnavigable waterway of the United States.” A law
may govern activities in only one state and still be the law of the land.

364

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 17, 1826), reprinted in
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1512, 1513-14 (Merrill Peterson ed., 1984).
365
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
366
THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
367
Id.
368
33 U.S.C. § 59q-1 (2000).
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Indeed, it is the law not only in Buffalo but also in the United States as
a whole that this canal in Buffalo is a nonnavigable waterway. Federal
laws imposing obligations in a particular state are common, as is state
participation in the development of such state-specific federal law. It
would be, however, to use John Jay’s term, “irrational” for federal law
in New York to be that this particular canal in Buffalo is nonnavigable
but in Pennsylvania to be that this particular canal in Buffalo is navigable. The supreme law of the land cannot be both. Were Congress
to purport to delegate to state courts the power to “legislate” federal
common law, it would be requiring state courts to make and enforce
law that does not operate as the supreme law of the land. Until a federal institution were properly to make such law the law of the land,
such law would operate only within the jurisdiction of the state. Regardless of whether we call this a congressional delegation of power to
make federal law, it in fact would only be an authorization to a state
court to make law of the state until a federal institution properly made
it the law of the land.
This is not a distinction without a difference. If a state court
properly may call law that it makes “federal” law, the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction to review the lawmaking act. A Supreme Court determination affirming the lawmaking act or reversing it in favor of its
own lawmaking act will result in a determination of federal law that,
unlike the state court’s determination, is enforceable as the law of the
land. If a state court properly may call law that it makes only “state”
law, the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to review the lawmaking act as such. In that case, only Congress, through a proper exercise of its enumerated powers, may create a law of the land governing the matter that the state court addressed. Accordingly, whether
law that a state court makes is properly called “federal” or “state” law
has significant ramifications for the ability of the Supreme Court to
participate in federal lawmaking and, conversely, of Congress to leave
federal lawmaking to the Supreme Court. The making of “federal”
law by state courts bypasses both the enumerated federal lawmaking
powers and the political accountability of Congress as a federal lawmaking institution.
When, then, is it proper for a state court to call law that it makes
“federal” law? It seems clear that the answer is only when a state court
makes law as a necessary consequence of its best efforts to apply existing principles of federal law. Only then can a state court be said, consistent with the requirements of the Supremacy Clause, to be enforcing the supreme law of the land. Is it the case that state courts may
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make different federal common law rules as a result of such efforts?
Of course, and they have. The jurisdictional conflicts in federal law
that result from this kind of lawmaking by state courts are conceptually different, however, than the conflicts that would arise were state
courts to attempt to set rather than enforce national policy. The specific intent of the Supremacy Clause was to preclude individual states
from making their own judgments of what national policy should be.
Jurisdictional conflicts that result from courts’ best efforts to discern
and apply existing law are simply an unavoidable byproduct of the judicial application of open-textured text and precedent. A state court
that set “national” policy by making a federal common law rule would
not be enforcing the supreme law of the land, binding on judges in
other states, no matter what that court said it was doing. A state court
deciding in accordance with existing federal law would be enforcing
the supreme law of the land, as the court thought that law bound
369
judges in other states.
This is not to say that all courts in the Union must apply the same
law as other courts would to all issues that arise in a case. It is well established that jurisdiction-specific law generally governs matters such
as procedure and justiciability. This is only to say that when a state
court purports to enforce the “supreme Law of the Land,” it must seek
to enforce its best understanding of existing principles of federal law.
It might also be asked what place the notion that states can serve
as laboratories for developing new social, political, and economic
ideas has in this analysis. Justice Brandeis famously wrote that “[i]t is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
370
Courts and scholars have oft repeated this rethe country.”

369

There is a parallel here between how state courts should determine issues of
federal law and how the Supreme Court has held that federal courts are to determine
issues of state law. When state law provides the rule of decision in federal court, “state
law is to be determined in the same manner as a federal court resolves an evolving issue of federal law: ‘with the aid of such light as [is] afforded by the materials for decision at hand, and in accordance with the applicable principles for determining state
law.’” Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 227 (1991) (alteration in original)
(quoting Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 238 (1943)). It would defy
the Supremacy Clause for state courts to resolve questions of federal law otherwise.
370
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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371

frain.
Would not recognizing a power in state courts to make federal common law in a legislative-type way better enable state courts to
fulfill this function? The problem with invoking this notion here is
that, by definition, federal law, when properly made, is binding on
state judges and preclusive of contradictory experimentation. This is
the central purpose of the Supremacy Clause. If Congress believes
that it should not legislate on a matter because further experimentation is warranted, it may leave the matter to state law. In that way, not
just state courts, but also state legislatures, may play their proper role
in such experimentation.
There is, of course, an important premise at work in this constitutional analysis of the propriety of federal lawmaking by state courts. It
is that courts can make law in the way that state court decisions, taken
at face value, have made federal common law. The account offered
necessarily rejects a skeptical account of judicial lawmaking that views
appeals by judges to “principle”—the kind of principle that accounts
for and explains prior judicial decisions and relevant statutes—as necessarily “political theater” masking a reality in which judges make “policy” decisions that seek to advance interests of the community pro372
In other words, this account does not view “consistency
spectively.
373
and order” as inherently mere “toys of the trade.”
E. Normative Considerations About How Courts Ought to Make Law
The way in which state court decisions, on their face, have historically made federal common law readily comports not only with the
Supremacy Clause, but also with certain normative claims about how
courts can and ought to make law. It does not follow from the fact
that judicial decisions in a real sense make law that they must make it
371

See e.g., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787-88
(1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing judicial and
scholarly references to this concept).
372
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 113 (1973).
373
Id. at 580. For an example of such skeptical thinking at the time of the rise of
judicial realism, see Hessel E. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37
YALE L.J. 468, 480 (1928), which asserts that the judicial process is “an emotive experience in which principles and logic play a secondary part.” For a more recent example,
see DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 2 (1997), arguing that judges
operate on the basis of an “externally motivated, ideological choice to work to develop
a particular restatement and a particular solution rather than another.” See also MARK
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 200 (1987) (describing the position
that “judges are just actors with some command over state force and socially acceptable
chatter; they are not acting in some privileged domain of reason that can or ought to
be protected from openly political conversation”).
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as a matter of purely forward-looking policy determinations. Scholars
of various jurisprudential stripes have described a common law process in which real constraints on judicial lawmaking are possible and
observed. Karl Llewellyn described a “Grand Style” of common law
adjudication (a style, which, he argued, adjudication ought to as374
sume), the “upshot” of which involved both the making of law
375
and controls on how judges make law.
Llewellyn observed that
“[b]eneath what looks on the page as ‘mere’ following, beneath
what . . . feel and seem, in the main, to the very deciding court itself
to be such ‘mere’ following, there swirls a constant current of crea376
The “Grand Style,” however, did not leave a judge “free to
tion.”
377
decide ‘as he wants to’”; rather, it involved certain “controlling factors”—“the doctrinal structure, the craftsmanship of the law and of
the office, and the immanent rightnesses, largely to be felt and
378
found”—that harnessed “the will or individual urges” of judges.
More recently, Ronald Dworkin has argued that judges are not
justified in acting as adjunct legislators in adjudicating cases. Dworkin
recognizes that we commonly, upon observing the reality that judges
379
He
make law, characterize judges as acting as “deputy legislators.”
argues, however, that “judges neither should be nor are deputy legislators, and the familiar assumption, that when they go beyond political
decisions already made by someone else they are legislating, is mis380
leading.” In Dworkin’s view, that which justifies a legislature in making the kind of prospective laws that legislatures typically make does
not justify courts in making law in the same way. “A legislature,”
Dworkin explains, “may justify its decision to create new rights for the
future by showing how these will contribute, as a matter of sound policy, to the overall good of the community . . . . [J]udges[, however,]
381
are in a very different position from legislators.” Dworkin adds that
[litigants] are entitled, in principle, to have their acts and affairs judged
in accordance with the best view of what the legal standards of the community required or permitted at the time they acted, and integrity de-

374

KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 37-38

(1960).
375
376
377
378
379
380
381

Id. at 116.
Id.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 402.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82 (1977).
Id.
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 244 (1986).

2005]

STATE COURTS AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW

911

mands that these standards be seen as coherent, as the state speaking
382
with a single voice.

Dworkin argues, further, that “[i]t does not fit the character of a
community of principle that a judge should have authority to hold
people liable in damages for acting in a way he concedes they had no
383
legal duty not to act.” Accordingly, “when judges construct rules of
liability not recognized before,” they, unlike legislatures, “must
make . . . decisions on grounds of principle, not policy: they must deploy arguments why the parties actually had the ‘novel’ legal rights
and duties they enforce at the time the parties acted or at some other
384
pertinent time in the past.” More specifically, judges should decide
“hard cases by trying to find, in some coherent set of principles about
people’s rights and duties, the best constructive interpretation of the
political structure and legal doctrine of their community. They try to
385
make that complex structure and record the best these can be.” In
short, Dworkin argues, the judge must make a decision on the basis of
a principle that “both fits and justifies what has gone before, so far as
386
that is possible.” This does not mean that judges are never justified
in overturning precedents. It means only that when they do so, they
must act as far as is possible in accordance with legal principles regarding when it is appropriate to depart from settled understandings
387
of legal principles.
382

Id. at 218. Similarly, Dworkin argues elsewhere that “[t]he gravitational force
of a precedent may be explained by appeal, not to the wisdom of enforcing enactments, but to the fairness of treating like cases alike.” DWORKIN, supra note 379, at
113.
383
DWORKIN, supra note 381, at 244; see also DWORKIN, supra note 379, at 102 (“We
do not think that [the judge] is free to legislate interstitially within the ‘open texture’
of imprecise rules.”) (citing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-32 (1961)).
384
DWORKIN, supra note 381, at 244.
385
Id. at 255.
386
Id. at 239.
387
Dworkin and Llewellyn are not the only theorists of the adjudicative process to
justify judicial lawmaking with reference to some standard of fitness and soundness.
See, e.g., NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 250 (1978) (summarizing his argument that, for a legal decision in a hard case to be justified, there
must be a relevant principle of law or analogy that supports it, and the decision must
pass tests of coherence, consistency, and consequences); John Finnis, Natural Law:
The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 1, 35 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (explaining that the “reasonableness” of particular legal “standards and institutions is not of the form ‘inevitably
required by reason (morality)’ but rather of the form ‘adopted by our law by choice
from among the range of reasonable options,’” and that “once these options have been
chosen, the rational requirements of coherence strongly limit the range of reasonable
options for further specification and development” (emphasis omitted)).
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Such normative claims do not view all cases as “easy” and none as
388
“hard.” They merely recognize the reality that there are wrong answers to legal questions even in cases in which there may not be one
389
right answer. Had the court in Franklin, a seemingly hard case, determined that it should resolve the survival question not on the basis
of whether the defendant benefited from the transaction as opposed
to whether his liability arose ex delicto, but rather on the basis of
whether the plaintiff generally was in need of money, whether the defendant was generally a good or a bad postmaster, whether other
claimants on the assets of the estate really needed the money, whether
the defendant had been a citizen of the United States for more than
ten years, or whether the defendant had blue eyes or not, the court
would have made a rule that perhaps served what it believed to be a
good national policy (help those in need of money, reward the estates
of good public servants, distribute assets on the basis of the present
needs of creditors, prefer established citizens over new citizens, prefer
people with one physical characteristic over those with another), but it
388

See DWORKIN, supra note 381, at 353-54 (“[Q]uestions of law are sometimes very
easy for lawyers and even for nonlawyers. It ‘goes without saying’ that the speed limit
in Connecticut is 55 miles an hour and that people in Britain have a legal duty to pay
for food they order in a restaurant.”); MACCORMICK, supra note 387, at 250 (“In the
simplest situation, where a clear rule is agreed by all parties to be clearly applicable,
the only problem is over proof of facts, and once a conclusion on that is reached, the
decision is justified by a simple deductive argument.”); John Finnis, Natural Law and
Legal Reasoning, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 134, 142 (Robert P.
George ed., 1992) (“[T]he law’s distinctive devices [are] defining terms, and specifying
rules, with sufficient and necessarily artificial clarity and definiteness to establish the
‘bright lines’ which make so many real-life legal questions easy questions.”). The existence of easy cases is evident not only in reported decisions that bear the features of
the easy case, but in the countless cases that are never brought because they lack merit
or settle before having to be decided.
The existence of hard cases has been explained in several different ways. As Neil
MacCormick summarizes: “[T]he alleged clarity of a rule is intrinsically disputable,
and problems of interpretation or classification may be raised; and moreover claims
may be put forward in circumstances in which no pre-established rule at all seems to
govern the issue—the ‘problem of relevancy’.” MACCORMICK, supra note 387, at 250.
Others have explained hard cases in terms of the discretionary decisions a court must
make before it may employ the tools of logic. Julius Stone observes that “even so far as
lawyers and judges do proceed by logical deduction, the premises which they use are
often not legal propositions at all.” JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS’
REASONINGS 52 (1964). Karl Llewellyn similarly observes that classifying facts is “a job
of fresh creation which has to be done before a true deduction becomes possible.”
LLEWELLYN, supra note 374, at 12.
For a summary of the literature on the distinction between easy and hard cases,
see William Lucy, Adjudication, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 387, at 206, 208-21.
389
1 Johns. 396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806).
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would not have been making a determination on the basis of any
principle that rendered it and existing law a coherent and sound
whole. That there may not be one right answer to a legal problem
does not mean that there are no wrong answers, or that the range of
not-wrong answers cannot be narrowed down to (say) two, even in a
hard case.
These nonskeptical theories of adjudication—be they categorized
390
as “positivistic” or “natural law” —are premised on the normative
claim that judges ought to try to decide a case in the same way that
other judges deciding the same case at the same time in the same
realm would decide it. Under these theories, the familiar phrase that
like cases should be treated alike is a shorthand formulation of a fun391
damental principle of fairness.

390

As John Finnis has explained:
[W]hat warrants warranted appeals to analogy is not a pattern of reasoning,
but an insight into some standard—perhaps never noticed or articulated before—which justifies both the earlier decision in A and the corresponding decision in B, and is appropriately coherent with the rest of the law and with
sound practical judgment at large.
Finnis, supra note 387, at 36-37 (footnote omitted). Llewellyn made the converse of
the same point, namely that “‘a distinction without a difference’”—one that is not
based on an insight into a standard that justified different treatment—“is a stench.”
LLEWELLYN, supra note 374, at 287.
391
See DWORKIN, supra note 381, at 165 (arguing that political morality “requires
government to speak with one voice, to act in a principled and coherent manner toward all its citizens, to extend to everyone the substantive standards of justice or fairness it uses for some”); MACCORMICK, supra note 387, at 150 (describing it as a “principle of justice in adjudication . . . to treat like cases alike, and therefore to treat this
case in a way in which it will be justifiable to treat future like cases”); Finnis, supra note
387, at 55 (“[J]udges confronted by an issue not settled by the plain meaning of a constitution or statute ought to try to settle it in the way that it would be settled by any
other judges hearing the case on the same day in the same realm.”). Similarly, Finnis
points out that:
In the working of the legal process, much turns on the principle—a principle of fairness—that litigants (and others involved in the process) should be
treated by judges (and others with power to decide) impartially, in the sense
that they are as nearly as possible to be treated by each judge as they would be
treated by every other judge.
Finnis, supra note 388, at 150. Compare MacCormick’s argument that:
It is sometimes said that equity is a matter of deciding each case on its own
special merits without regard to general rules or principles. It seems to me
that that view is pure nonsense. I cannot for the life of me understand how
there can be such a thing as a good reason for deciding any single case which
is not a good generic reason for deciding cases of the particular type in view,
that is to say, the ‘merits’ of any individual case are the merits of the type of
case to which the individual case belongs.
MACCORMICK, supra note 387, at 97.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MAKING OF FEDERAL
COMMON LAW BY FEDERAL COURTS
Does this analysis of the making of federal common law by state
courts offer any insights into what justifies the making of federal
common law by federal courts? This Part offers some preliminary
thoughts on this question. Consider this question with respect to,
first, federal courts without national jurisdiction and, second, federal
courts with national jurisdiction.
Most inferior federal courts, like state courts, do not exercise a national jurisdiction. Rather, Congress has defined the jurisdiction of
federal courts of appeals and district courts with reference to geo392
graphic territory.
Thus, while the judgment of an inferior federal
court against a party is generally enforceable against that party in any
393
federal district in the United States, a federal common law rule that
an inferior federal court decision may make is not authoritative
against all nonlitigants within the jurisdiction of the United States.
In most matters, a district court does not have personal jurisdiction over all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
394
rather, it has jurisdiction over those present in or having minimum
395
contacts with the state in which the district court sits, assuming state
long-arm jurisdiction extends that far. An appeal, in most matters,
can be taken from a district court only to “the court of appeals . . .
396
Federal district and circuit
for the circuit embracing the district.”
courts thus operate in most matters under similar limitations as state
courts on their ability to make law that is “the supreme Law of the
397
That said, federal courts without national jurisdiction cerLand.”
392

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 81-132 (2000) (creating both circuit courts of appeal and
district courts according to state boundaries).
393
See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2000) (providing that any judgment entered in a federal
court of appeals or district court “may be registered . . . in any other district . . . . A
judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of
the district where registered and may be enforced in like manner.”).
394
See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(holding that “jurisdiction based on physical presence alone” does not violate due process).
395
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam . . . he
[must] have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] . . . .”).
396
28 U.S.C. § 1294 (2000).
397
This is what generates the problem of “agency nonacquiescence”: the refusal
of a federal agency to follow the case law of a particular federal district court or court
of appeals. See Ross E. Davies, Remedial Nonacquiescence, 89 IOWA L. REV. 65, 68 (2003)
(examining a different type of nonacquiescense in which agencies “leverage a court’s
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tainly are no less justified in making federal common law than state
courts are.
First, the same necessity to make federal common law to enforce
existing federal law that arises in state courts arises in federal courts.
As the case study presented earlier demonstrates, the federal court in
Epstein had to make federal common law to enforce the federal claim
398
Second, it seems probable
that it had a statutory duty to enforce.
that a study of historical federal court practice would reveal that federal courts, like state courts, traditionally have enforced federal common law—or, in early days, general law—on the basis of what they discerned the existing law of the land to require. This was the case in
399
both Korn (1829), decided according to general principles, as well as
400
401
in Epstein (1997), decided according to federal common law. This
manner of decision making comports with an understanding of federal law as law that operates as the supreme law of the land. Like state
courts, federal courts that do not have national jurisdiction can only
be said to be enforcing the supreme law of the land when they enforce existing principles of federal law as much as it is possible to do
so. This manner of decision making also comports with the normative claim that judges ought to decide issues governed by federal
common law rules of decision as far as possible in the same way as
other judges in the same realm would decide them on the same day.
There is no question that federal courts without national jurisdiction
should be understood to have at least the same authority that state
courts have to make federal common law. Claims that they have more
authority, however, raise serious constitutional questions about the
nature of federal law as the Supremacy Clause conceives of it, and
broader normative questions about how a court properly determines
the law that it will enforce.
Consider next federal courts with national jurisdiction. The Supreme Court exercises national jurisdiction with respect to federal law
matters. It has authority to review federal law determinations made by

contempt power to avoid problems of nonacquiescence in other jurisdictions”); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98
YALE L.J. 679, 718-53 (1989) (defining agency nonacquiescense and evaluating both its
constitutionality and the costs and benefits of the practice).
398
See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text (describing the Epstein holding
that RICO claims survive the death of the defendant in all cases).
399
United States v. Korn, 26 F. Cas. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1829) (No. 15,543).
400
Epstein v. Epstein, 966 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
401
See supra text accompanying notes 250-63 (examining the federal common law
made in Epstein and Korn).
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402

federal courts of appeals and the highest court of any state in which
403
Certain infethe federal law determination at issue could be had.
rior federal courts also exercise a national jurisdiction. For example,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals from federal district courts na404
tionally. It will suffice for present purposes to focus on the Supreme
Court.
First, the same necessity that justifies state courts and inferior federal courts in making federal common law in certain cases justifies the
Supreme Court in making federal common law in certain cases. If, in
certain cases, state and lower federal courts necessarily must make
federal common law to enforce federal law, the Supreme Court, upon
review of such determinations, must do the same. The manner in
which Supreme Court decisions have made federal common law,
however, does not appear to be as consistent as it has been in state
405
courts, at least post-Erie. In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, the
Supreme Court famously explained that when the rights and duties of
the United States are at stake and in the “absence of an applicable Act
of Congress[,] it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule
406
The Supreme Court has
of law according to their own standards.”
407
made similar statements in other cases.
In Clearfield the Court
treated background principles of commercial law not as principles
with which the Court’s decision should comport, but “as a convenient
408
source of reference for fashioning federal rules.”
In other cases, the Court has invoked preexisting legal principles
not as a mere source of reference, but as binding authority. In
409
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, the Court found that, in the face of congressional silence on the statute of limitations for the enforcement of a
federal right, “[w]e have the duty of federal courts, sitting as national
courts throughout the country, to apply their own principles in en410
forcing an equitable right created by Congress.” The Court did not
402

28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2000).
Id. § 1257.
404
Id. § 1295.
405
318 U.S. 363 (1943).
406
Id. at 367.
407
See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979)
(“Clearfield directs federal courts to fill the interstices of federal legislation ‘according
to their own standards.’” (quoting Clearfield, 318 U.S. at 367)).
408
Clearfield, 318 U.S. at 367.
409
327 U.S. 392 (1946).
410
Id. at 395.
403
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portray its role, however, as devising these principles based on national policy considerations. Rather, it explained that “[w]hen Congress leaves to the federal courts the formulation of remedial details, it
can hardly expect them to break with historic principles of equity in
411
The Court
the enforcement of federally-created equitable rights.”
proceeded to apply standards that “[t]raditionally and for good rea412
sons” courts had applied to requests for equitable relief.
At first
glance, the general practice of the Supreme Court in this regard
seems somewhat inconsistent.
How do the constitutional provisions and normative concerns addressed with respect to state courts relate to the making of federal
common law by the Supreme Court? Regarding the Supremacy
Clause’s conception of federal law as “the Law of the Land,” the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is different in a material respect from
that of state courts and most inferior federal courts: it is nationwide.
Accordingly, federal common law that the Supreme Court makes, unlike federal common law that state courts make, operates as federal
law with effect upon its very making—in other words, it governs within
the jurisdiction of the United States. Does this mean that the Supreme Court has a freedom under the constitutional structure to
make federal common law on the basis of purely forward-looking national policy concerns that state courts do not have?
Not necessarily. For the Supreme Court to have a power to “legislate” federal common law, something must explain what justifies the
Court in applying a rule of decision—e.g., the one in Clearfield that the
court devised “according to its own standards”—that the state court
would not have had authority to apply in the first instance. It is true
that the Supreme Court has held that it may apply on appeal a different law than a lower court applied when Congress has retroactively
413
changed the law during the course of litigation. It has justified this
practice since the time of the Founding, however, in the judicial duty
of all courts, no matter what the stage of litigation, to “decide accord414
The general normative claim that a court
ing to existing laws.”

411

Id.
Id. at 396.
413
See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 226 (1995).
414
See id. at 227(“It is the obligation of the last court in the hierarchy that rules on
the case to give effect to Congress’s latest enactment, even when that has the effect of
overturning the judgment of an inferior court, since each court, at every level, must
‘decide according to existing laws.’” (quoting United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 103, 109 (1801) (Marshall, J.))).
412
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ought to decide a case as every other court applying the same governing law would decide it on the same day would seem equally applicable to the Supreme Court as it is to state courts.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to work out all the ramifications for federal courts of the explanation presented here of the legitimate operation of federal common law in state courts. Let us assume, though, that, like state courts, federal courts are justified in
making federal common law only as a necessary consequence of discerning as best as possible the requirements of existing law.
Theories that argue that federal courts are justified in applying
federal common law rules of decision only as necessary to enforce
constitutional principles are not inconsistent with this position. Most
notably, Brad Clark has argued that federal common law rules may
operate only “to further some basic aspect of the constitutional
scheme—for example, by preventing the judiciary and the states from
interfering with matters that the Constitution assigns exclusively to the
political branches of the federal government, or by implementing the
415
constitutional equality of the states.” If courts are justified in making federal common law rules only as necessary to enforce existing law
and only based on reasons that comport with existing legal principles,
courts must take account of constitutional principles that speak to the
questions of when federal common law rather than state law may apply and what the particular content of a federal common law rule may
be.
Moreover, the field that federal common law occupies under the
theory that this Article offers is much the same as the field that federal
common law occupies under Tom Merrill’s delegation theory of federal common law. Almost all delegations under Merrill’s theory are
implied delegations where either “the enacting body adopts a broad
legal standard that federal courts are directed to apply in resolving
416
controversies,” or “Congress adopts a legal standard that is borrowed
417
In applying either of these
from (or ‘codifies’) the common law.”
kinds of standards as the rule of decision, a state court necessarily in
certain cases would have to make federal law in order to render any
decision at all. To justify judicial lawmaking in such cases, however, it
is not necessary to say that Congress has delegated power to the court
to make federal common law. The duty to enforce federal law will jus-

415
416
417

Clark, supra note 6, at 1251.
Merrill, supra note 7, at 43.
Id. at 44.
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tify courts in making federal law as necessary to fulfill the duty. As
418
Chief Justice John Marshall observed in Marbury v. Madison, “[t]hose
who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and
419
interpret [the] rule.” It appears that nearly all areas of permissible
federal lawmaking under Merrill’s theory would be permissible under
the theory articulated here. The argument here clarifies, however,
that when judges must make federal common law to decide a case,
they need not have received a delegation of legislative power to be justified in doing so and, indeed, if federal courts are subject to the same
constraints as state courts in how they make such law, are not justified
in making such law based on the kinds of policy reasons that might
move Congress to make federal law.
Finally, this analysis has implications for the way in which Congress makes law as well. Scholars have been quick to criticize courts
when it comes to the enterprise of federal common law lawmaking. In
any discussion of the responsibility of state or federal courts to make
federal common law, however, the responsibilities of Congress should
not be overlooked. As Congress enacts laws with more open-ended
standards and wider gaps, the exercise of a court’s responsibility to enforce them becomes more complex. This Article has argued that state
courts have a duty to make federal law only as a consequence of their
best efforts to resolve an issue according to the legal principles that
they believe would bind every other judge in the nation if faced with
the same issue. The responsible discharge of this duty should lead to
greater uniformity in the federal law that courts apply nationwide
than the neglect of this duty. It is not merely the responsibility of
courts, however, to tend to the uniform application of federal law; the
Constitution provides express roles for Congress in this regard as well.
The Constitution gives Congress great latitude in creating and confer420
ring jurisdiction upon inferior federal courts and in regulating the
421
It also gives it great
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
latitude in conferring on federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cer-

418

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 177.
420
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.”).
421
See id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (establishing the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
as being subject to “such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make”).
419

920

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 153: 825

422

tain matters. The organizational and jurisdictional structure of the
courts in which federal claims are to be heard directly bears on the extent to which courts are able to maintain uniformity in federal law.
Most importantly, though, it is Congress that enacts “the Laws of the
United States” that bind state and federal judges. We must never lose
sight, in assessing whether state and federal judges are responsibly deciding cases in which they must make federal law, that it is the responsibility of Congress to assess, in the first instance, what degree of specificity in its enactments best serves the common good.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to demonstrate four things. First, state
courts make federal common law in as real a sense as federal courts
make it. Second, theories that have attempted to explain the making
of federal common law by federal courts are inadequate to explain the
making of federal common law by state courts. Their common premise that courts make federal common law on the basis of the kinds of
considerations that might move Congress to enact a federal statute
largely accounts for the inadequacy. Third, historical practice, the
constitutional structure, and certain normative claims about the way
in which courts ought to make law all point to the following constraint
on the way in which state courts justifiably may make federal common
law: state courts may make federal common law not on the basis of
purely forward-looking policy considerations, but only as a consequence of their best efforts to enforce federal law as it existed at the
time pertinent to the issue being resolved. Fourth, federal courts are
justified in making federal common law in at least the same circumstances and under the same constraints as state courts. There is good
reason, however, to rethink the common premise that where federal
courts are justified in making federal common law, they are justified
in making it as an adjunct federal legislature.

422

Early Congresses understood they had the constitutional ability to confer exclusive jurisdiction over certain types of claims on the federal courts. For example,
“[s]ince the Patent Act of 1800, Congress has lodged exclusive jurisdiction of actions
‘arising under’ the patent laws in the federal courts.” Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1338).

